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ABSTRACT 
 
Equity Evaluation of  
Vehicle Miles Traveled Fees in Texas. (August 2011) 
Lisa Kay Larsen, 
B.S., Brigham Young University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Mark Burris 
 
 The Texas state gas tax has been 20.0 cents per gallon since 1991, and the federal 
gas tax has been 18.4 cents per gallon since 1993.  The gas tax is not only stagnant, but 
depreciating in value due to inflation.  Thus, damage is being done to the infrastructure 
but the money needed to maintain and improve roadways is not being adequately 
generated.  One proposed alternative to the gas tax is the creation of a vehicle miles 
traveled (VMT) fee, with equity being a crucial issue to consider. 
This research used 2009 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) Texas data 
to consider the equity impacts surrounding four VMT fee scenarios.  Data were filtered 
and weighted to reflect results representative of Texas vehicle-owning households in 
2008.  Each scenario was run both statically and dynamically under the assumption that 
the VMT fee would replace the state gas tax.   
An assessment of the relative vertical equity of each scenario was made by 
calculating the Gini Coefficient associated with the proportion of state gas tax or VMT 
fee revenue generated by each household income level quintile.  Results indicate that all 
iv 
 
of the VMT fee scenarios are essentially as equally vertically equitable as the current 
state gas tax system.  Scenario 4 was designed to be inherently horizontally equitable 
because the per mile fee associated with each roadway type (urban or rural) was assessed 
to all vehicles driven on these roadway types at a rate calculated to generate needed 
funds to address the mobility and infrastructure needs of that roadway type.  Scenario 3, 
a scenario favoring vehicles with high fuel efficiency, was found to be the least 
horizontally equitable. 
Scenarios 2-4 were able to generate additional revenue desired to meet the 
infrastructure and mobility needs of Texas set forth by the 2030 Texas Transportation 
Needs Committee.  The large fee increase necessary to achieve the desired additional 
revenue may not be popular or possible.  However, an evaluation of the philosophy 
governing each scenario designed to generate additional revenue is informative when it 
comes to equity impacts.  No one VMT fee scenario affects all household income levels 
and geographic locations uniformly and it was not the goal of this research to design an 
equitable VMT fee scenario.  Rather, the effect of each scenario on 2008 Texas vehicle-
owning households disaggregated by household income level and geographic location 
are presented and left to the discretion of elected officials to decide which VMT fee, if 
any, would be best for their constituents.    
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The Texas state gas tax is currently 20.0 cents per gallon, and has been since 
1991.  The federal gas tax is 18.4 cents per gallon and has not changed since 1993.  The 
gas tax is not only stagnant but is depreciating in value.  According to a front-page 
article in USA Today by Dennis Cauchon, “Although the federal gas tax—18.4 cents per 
gallon—hasn‟t changed since 1993, tax collections are down because today‟s vehicles 
go farther on a gallon of gas, cutting tax collections while increasing wear and tear on 
highways.  Inflation since 1993 has eroded the value of the tax to maintain roads 
(Cauchon, 2010).”  In this same vein, Cho and Powers state that, “The nation‟s 
population and number of vehicle miles traveled are increasing, yet the purchasing 
power of the highway trust fund‟s fuel tax revenue is decreasing (Cho and Powers, 
2006).”  The fuel efficiency of new vehicles on America‟s roadways is only going to 
improve.  President Obama recently announced a new national fuel economy standard of 
35.5 miles per gallon for new vehicles, effective 2016 (Broder, 2009).  While this new 
standard will help contribute towards cleaner air stemming from fewer emissions, it 
negatively impacts transportation funding under the current gas tax funding system.       
 
____________ 
This thesis follows the journal style of the Journal of Transportation Engineering. 
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Additionally, the need for transportation funding has not remained constant.   
Rather, there is the growing need to maintain and improve the existing, aging 
infrastructure, while expanding and enhancing the facilities available to motorists.  
America‟s infrastructure  received an overall D rating in the 2009 American Society of 
Civil Engineers (ASCE) report card, with roads receiving a D-, bridges receiving a C, 
and transit receiving a D (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2009).  A variety of 
solutions have been theorized to help increase revenue available for transportation 
projects and make travelers more accountable for their use of the infrastructure; with 
solutions ranging from increasing the gas tax, expanding toll ways, and increasing the 
vehicle registration fee.  
Recently, this issue has received national attention as various plans to help 
reduce, and eventually eliminate, the national debt have been proposed.  One of the 
plans, championed by Senator Tom Carper of Delaware and Senator George Voinovich 
of Ohio, proposes incrementally raising the federal gas tax to eventually reach 43.4 cents 
per gallon.  As noted by Dennison, “In total, the senators said in their letter, the 25-cent 
tax hike would generate $200 billion in revenue over five years. Of that, $117 billion 
would end up earmarked for transfer to the federal Highway Trust Fund, which Carper 
and Voinovich said is badly in need of funding (Denison, 2010).”  
Similarly, suggestions made in December 2010 by the National Commission on 
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform included increasing the gas tax incrementally by 15-
cents per gallon between 2013 and 2015.  Additional recommendations included 
“limit[ing] spending to actual revenues collected by the trust fund in the prior year once 
 3 
the gas tax is fully phased in.  Shortfalls up until that point would be financed by the 
general fund (National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, 2010).” 
Infrastructure was listed among the important areas to invest in to “help our economy 
grow, keep us globally competitive, and make it easier for businesses to create jobs 
(National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, 2010).”      
   However, the gas tax is often viewed as a “second-best” policy—which, 
although not able to best address any one issue, can simultaneously address multiple 
issues fairly well (Lin and Prince, 2009).  Thus, while proposals to increase the gas tax 
have the potential to address the issue of generating the funds needed for infrastructure 
maintenance and improvements, this approach does not fully address the potential that 
improving vehicle fuel efficiencies will eventually minimize funds generated on a per 
gallon basis.  As vehicle fuel economies continue to increase, motorists will gradually 
become less accountable for their use of the transportation system.  According to 
McMullen et al., “Until recently fuel taxes were thought to be fairly good proxy for 
optimal road use fees that charge users based on the damage (or marginal costs) they 
impose on the road (McMullen, Zhang and Nakahara, 2010).”  However, with vehicles 
becoming ever more fuel efficient, the gas tax is quickly losing its link to how much the 
infrastructure is used.   
In the Final Report of the National Surface Transportation Infrastructure 
Financing Commission that was released in February 2009, the Commission described 
several funding options that are available to address growing infrastructure needs.  The 
Committee expressed their opinion that short-term, increasing the current gas tax is the 
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best option given large installation costs associated with implementing a new 
transportation fee system.  However, the Commission also suggested that turning to a 
VMT fee system is the best option when looking past just the short-term situation, 
stating that, “The most viable approach to efficiently fund federal investment in surface 
transportation in the medium to long run will be a user charge system based more 
directly on miles driven (and potentially on factors such as time of day, type of road, and 
vehicle weight and fuel economy) rather than indirectly on fuel consumed (National 
Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission, 2009).”  
 
RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Given the recent interest in the possibility of a VMT fee system, research on this 
topic is timely.  There are several questions to consider in the design and eventual 
implementation of a VMT fee scenario.  How well will this scenario generate revenue?  
What logistical issues surround its implementation?  What will be the public‟s reaction 
to the transportation fee change and to what extent will their travel patterns differ 
because of it?  Who will pay more under the new system and who will pay less; will the 
new system be equitable?  Equity is one VMT fee aspect that should be evaluated and 
presented to elected officials and policy-makers in deciding upon which VMT fee, if 
any, to implement.  Equity impacts are also important for the public to understand.  
Evaluating the equity of several VMT fee scenarios was the focus of this research effort. 
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this research was to develop, test, and analyze four VMT fee 
scenarios with respect to equity.  It is important to note that the objective was not to 
create and champion an equitable VMT fee scenario.  Rather, an attempt was made to 
present the scenario results in a clear, concise manner that will enable elected officials 
and policy-makers to have access to equity impact information when making decisions 
on which VMT fee, if any, would be best for their constituents.  The following section 
describes the research methodology and gives a brief summary of the scenarios that were 
analyzed.   
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SCENARIOS 
Texas data from the 2009 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS) were 
available in two forms—the Texas Add-on dataset and the Texas survey data made 
available through the NHTS website (http://nhts.ornl.gov/index.shtml).  Prior to 
performing any analysis it was necessary to merge needed variables from each dataset.  
Next, the data were filtered to only include complete and relevant household and vehicle 
information.  The filtered data were then weighted to reflect 2008 Texas vehicle-owning 
households.  Using the properly filtered, merged, and weighted data, four VMT fee 
scenarios were analyzed and compared to the current gas tax funding system using two 
different methodologies.  First, a static model was considered, which assumed that no 
change in travel occurred as a result of implementing a new transportation fee.  Next, a 
dynamic model was implemented using price elasticities disaggregated by household 
 6 
income level and geographic region.  The dynamic model reflected changes in travel that 
were anticipated to stem from changes to the transportation fee.  The filtering, merging, 
weighting, and scenario implementation process is further described in Chapter III.  The 
four scenarios that were analyzed for equity are described below. 
Scenario 1:  Flat VMT Fee 
 This scenario established a flat per-mile VMT fee that generated a similar 
amount of net revenue as the amount already collected in Texas through the state gas 
tax.  Although this scenario would not serve to increase the funds currently generated 
through the state gas tax, it could be used as a tool to familiarize drivers with the concept 
of a VMT fee.       
Scenario 2:  Flat VMT Fee for Added Revenue 
 Similar to Scenario 1, this scenario established a flat per-mile VMT fee.  
However, rather than simply generating a revenue similar to that currently collected 
through the Texas state gas tax, this scenario examined collecting the additional revenue 
needed to reach the infrastructure and mobility goals established by the 2030 Committee 
on Texas Transportation Needs—which totaled an additional $14.3 billion annually 
(Texas 2030 Committee, 2009). 
Scenario 3:  Three-Tier VMT Fee to Encourage “Green” Vehicles 
This scenario was designed to develop a VMT fee system that would encourage 
the use of fuel-efficient vehicles.  Initially, vehicles with a fuel economy less than the 
median fuel economy were charged a $0.020 per mile VMT fee; vehicles with a fuel 
economy between the median value and the mean value were charged a VMT fee of 
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$0.015 per mile; and vehicles with a fuel economy greater than the mean value were 
charged a VMT fee of $0.010 per mile.  This scenario structure was designed under the 
assumption that the mean vehicle fuel economy is greater than the median vehicle fuel 
economy.  The idea behind this scenario stems from a scenario implemented in research 
performed by Zhang and McMullen in their paper entitled, Green Vehicle Mileage Fees:  
Concept, Evaluation Methodology, Revenue Impact, and User Responses (Zhang and 
McMullen, 2010).  Upon calculating the total revenue generated under this VMT fee 
scenario, the fees assessed to each fuel economy level were then scaled to more 
accurately meet the projected revenue needed to address Texas‟s infrastructure and 
mobility needs; with an additional $14.3 billion of revenue generated annually.   
Scenario 4:  Urban versus Rural Distinction 
 Urban roadways and rural roadways have different costs, characteristics and 
travelers.  Urban roadways are generally more congested and serve higher volumes of 
vehicles often taking shorter (length-wise) trips.  On the other hand, rural facilities allow 
for more direct travel between remote locations; though at times they are infrequently 
traveled.  Given their different and distinct functions and costs, it may be more equitable 
to charge a different rate for urban and rural travel; as suggested by Mark Hornung 
through discussion boards posted by members of the Transportation Research Board 
(TRB) Freight Transportation Economics and Regulation Committee (unpublished 
work).  This scenario assessed a different flat VMT fee for travel on urban roadways and 
travel on rural roadways.  
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All scenarios were based on the concept of keeping the federal gas tax 
unchanged, but replacing the Texas state gas tax with the proposed VMT fee scenarios 
for all gasoline-run vehicles included in this analysis.  Transportation fees assessed to 
vehicles not running on gasoline and vehicle types not included in this analysis would 
continue to be assessed the state gas tax—rather than converting to the proposed VMT 
fees.  The following section describes what each chapter within this thesis includes. 
 
  THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter I, Introduction, provides a background on the motivation behind 
considering potential VMT fee scenarios and the importance behind studying the equity 
impacts of the VMT scenarios.  A brief description of the data used in the equity analysis 
is given.  An introduction to the two data models used in this analysis—namely static 
and dynamic—is provided.  Additionally, the four scenarios analyzed as part of this 
research effort are briefly outlined.  Lastly, an outline of what is contained in the 
remainder of this thesis is provided.     
Chapter II, Literature Review, includes background information on supporting 
topics ranging from VMT fee case studies, to issues surrounding the design and 
implementation of VMT fees, to equity, to model selection, to Texas infrastructure 
needs.  
Chapter III, Data Merging, Filtering, and Weighting, begins by providing 
some background information on the NHTS.  A description of the process used to merge 
data from both the Texas Add-on dataset and Version 2.1 of the publically available 
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NHTS dataset is given.  The process and criteria used to filter the NHTS data to only 
include complete, relevant vehicle and household information is outlined.  Additionally, 
a description is provided on the techniques used to weight the survey data to reflect the 
vehicle-owning households of Texas.   
Chapter IV, VMT Fee Scenario Structure, Analysis, and Results, further 
describes the structure of each of the VMT fee scenarios considered in this analysis.  
Then, a description of how each of the four scenarios was applied to the weighted data—
first using a static model and then using a dynamic model—is given.  A discussion of 
differences in the results obtained using the two model types is provided.  A list of 
potential VMT fee goals for policy-makers to use as a starting point in creating their own 
VMT fee goals is provided.  Additionally, a comparison of the equity impacts for each 
scenario is presented. 
Chapter V, Conclusions and Recommendations, supplies a discussion of 
conclusions that can be drawn from the equity results obtained for each scenario.  Areas 
of future research that may stem from the work performed within this thesis are 
suggested.      
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
In performing research on the equity of VMT fee scenarios in Texas, there are 
several related topics that deserve review.  This chapter presents pertinent background 
information in areas related to this research effort.  Included topics encompass VMT fee 
case studies illustrating the need for further research; issues related to VMT fee 
implementation; equity and how it is measured; model type selection and the strengths 
and weaknesses surrounding the use of a static model versus a dynamic model; as well 
as growing Texas infrastructure needs and how the VMT fee scenarios performed within 
this research can help address projected funding need estimates. 
 
VMT FEES 
 VMT fees are viewed by many as an attractive option to replace the gas tax 
because of its ability to better hold motorists accountable for their use of the roadway 
and to foster the collection of funds needed to maintain and improve the infrastructure 
(Zhang and McMullen, 2010); (Forkenbrock and Hanley, 2006); (Lindsey, 2010); 
(Zhang, McMullen, Valluri and Nakahara, 2009); (McMullen, Zhang and Nakahara, 
2010); (National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission, 2009).  
Several states have experience with some form of implemented pilot studies of VMT 
fees.  The next two sections review case studies and research related to VMT fees and 
the major issues surrounding their design and eventual implementation.     
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Case Studies:  Oregon 
The 2001 Oregon Road User Fee Task Force (RUFTF) was charged with 
brainstorming possible transportation fee ideas.  As a result, a VMT fee pilot test was 
conducted in Oregon.  The test involved over 200 vehicles and had two service stations 
equipped with the technology needed to communicate with those 200 participating 
Global Positioning System (GPS) equipped vehicles.  The pilot test concluded that the 
implementation of a VMT fee scenario has potential, and would become increasingly 
feasible as technology improves.  Until wide-spread technology for VMT fee collection 
becomes available, unequipped vehicles could continue to be charged the state gas tax 
(Rufolo and Kimpel, 2008).  Additionally, the pilot test compared the effect that being 
charged a VMT fee equivalent to the amount paid under the state gas tax by a vehicle 
with average fuel efficiency, versus being charged a higher VMT fee during the peak-
hour and a lower VMT fee during the off-peak hours, had on driving behavior.  
Compared to the control group that continued to be charged the state gas tax, persons 
charged a VMT fee drove less.  Additionally, persons who had to pay a higher VMT fee 
in the peak period drove 20 percent less during the peak-hours when compared to the flat 
VMT category (Rufolo and Kimpel, 2008).  This supports the idea that use of a dynamic 
model in assessing VMT fee impacts may be beneficial in reducing VMT—especially 
during peak-hours.  However, it is difficult to say whether this result would be observed 
to the same extent if the subjects were not under experimental conditions.      
Additional aspects of VMT fee experiments performed in Oregon have been the 
focus of several research papers within the literature.  For instance, Kim et al. discuss the 
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technology that was used in Oregon‟s VMT-fee pilot test in their article; focusing on the 
on-vehicle device technology, the service static technology, and the data storage and 
retrieval technology (Kim, Porter, Whitty, Svadlenak, Larsen, Capps, Imholt, Pearson 
and Hall, 2008).  The authors remark that the pilot test showed that technology can 
enable VMT fees to be collected without drivers and system operators needing to spend 
extra time and effort in reporting and handling VMT fees.  Additionally, the technology 
configuration used would allow VMT fees to be implemented gradually, in a manner 
that would allow for the dual operation of either the gas tax system or a VMT fee 
system—until all vehicles had the properly installed technology needed for VMT fee 
collection (Kim, Porter, Whitty, Svadlenak, Larsen, Capps, Imholt, Pearson and Hall, 
2008).   
Case Studies:  Iowa 
A large-scale study on mile-based fees is currently being conducted by the 
University of Iowa Public Policy Center (The University of Iowa Public Policy Center, 
2011).  As part of this road user study, an on-board computer capable of tracking VMT 
was installed in the vehicles of volunteers in twelve cities across America.  The on-board 
computers were used to monitor motorist‟s travel for ten months.  Participating vehicles 
continued to be charged the current gas tax—with the VMT fee being purely theoretical 
and tabulated only for research purposes.  Participating vehicles were paid for their 
participation, contingent on their receiving training and on their duration of participation.  
The VMT fee rate varied based on the participant‟s jurisdiction location and the fuel 
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efficiency of their vehicle.  Results of the study are still being compiled, and upon their 
completion will be presented to the Department of Transportation.    
Case Studies:  I-95 Corridor Coalition 
States along the eastern coast of the United States (who are part of the I-95 
Corridor Coalition) have discussed the possibility of establishing a multi-state VMT 
revenue system.  As part of an effort to examine legal issues surrounding the Coalition, 
surveys of eight of the entities involved in the Coalition (in addition to Oregon, given its 
vast VMT experience) were undertaken.  Although issues such as revenue collection, 
system structure (fee, tax, toll), privacy concerns, revenue distribution, rate 
determination, and multi-state agreements were discussed, “None of the responses 
suggested a state-wide VMT-based system of charges would create insurmountable state 
constitutional or other legal issues (I-95 Corridor Coalition, 2011).” 
VMT Fee Self-Financing Research:  Indiana 
As part of Indiana‟s efforts to develop VMT fee scenarios, research was 
conducted to determine the self-financing level of urban and rural roadway 
classifications.  Options of simply maintaining the revenue level currently collected with 
the gas tax system or increasing the revenue to desired levels for future transportation 
infrastructure needs were considered.  Scenarios replacing either the state gas tax or both 
the state and federal gas tax were tested.  Oh et al. found that a cross-subsidy across 
different facility types occurs when a flat VMT fee is applied; with urban highways 
subsidizing rural non-interstate systems, rural interstate systems subsidizing rural non-
interstate systems, and urban non-interstate systems subsidizing urban interstate systems.  
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Financing equity can be achieved across facility type when varying fees are paid on 
differing facilities (Oh, Labi and Sinha, 2007). 
VMT Pollution Fee Research:  California 
Research was done by Kavalec and Setiawan on the possibility of a pollution fee 
in southern California charged on a VMT basis.  Vehicles with different emission levels 
would be charged a different per mile fee rate.  The simulation indicated that a pollution 
fee with this design may be regressive in nature because generally lower income 
households own older vehicles that produce more pollutants.  However, the regressive 
nature of the pollution fee would likely diminish with time (Kavalec and Setiawan, 
1997).  The authors also indicated that keeping track of vehicle miles may be an issue, 
stating that, “preventing noncompliance, evasion, or fraud may be difficult (Kavalec and 
Setiawan, 1997).” 
Case Studies:  VMT Insurance 
Some companies already offer per-mile insurance (i.e., MileMeter in Texas, Real 
Insurance PAYD in Australia, Nedbank Pay Per K Coverage in South Africa, 
PolisDirect in Holland, Progressive MyRate, etc.) (Litman, 2010).  Litman argues that 
this type of insurance system, “Increases equity by making premiums more actuarially 
accurate.  It makes vehicle ownership more affordable and provides financial savings, 
particularly for lower income motorists (Litman, 2010).”  It is also argued that safety is 
closely linked to the number of miles driven; thus, if vehicles are driven less, the chance 
of an accident decreases.  As with other VMT fee research, there are several areas of 
concern; including privacy, fraud, and administrative costs.  Based on an analysis that 
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considered the implementation costs and effectiveness of five different distance-based 
pricing options (mileage rate factor, pay-at the pump, per-mile premiums, per-minute 
premiums, and GPS-based pricing), Litman found that the mandatory per-mile premium 
“provide[d] the greatest net benefits (Litman, 2010).”      
Issues Surrounding VMT Fees       
As states continue to research the best course of action to take in the 
development of a transportation fee that will meet their future needs, there are a number 
of issues to address—many of which relate to VMT fee scenarios.  Of paramount 
importance is how the proposed transportation fee will be able to capture needed revenue 
for transportation projects.  As previously mentioned, America‟s infrastructure is 
deteriorating and is in need of additional funding.  It may be prudent to initially establish 
a system that merely matches the amount currently collected through the gas tax, and 
then incrementally increase the amount charged to reach a desired sum needed to help 
bridge the current funding gap between available transportation funding and revenue 
needed to maintain and improve the transportation infrastructure.   
However, in the process of striving to increase transportation revenue, it is 
important to consider the overarching goal of establishing a new transportation fee.  As 
stated by former United States Transportation Secretary, Mary Peters, “It is far more 
critical that the federal government establish clear policies, providing appropriate 
incentives and allocating resources more efficiently, than it is for substantial increases in 
total federal spending (Koss, 2008).”  The same could be said of transportation funds at 
the state level. 
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 Another critical issue to consider is the method of fee collection.  Technology 
continues to evolve and allow for more tasks to be performed better, faster, and cheaper.  
In the case of a VMT fee, there needs to be a method established to both collect mileage 
data and assess the proper charge to the vehicle owner.  Odometer readings are one 
option.  However, issues of mileage reporting integrity arise, as previously mentioned by 
Kavalec and Setiawan (Kavalec and Setiawan, 1997).  Dishonest people will always find 
a way to beat the system; yet the vast majority would likely be honest in their mileage 
reporting, which could be collected during the yearly vehicle registration process (where 
that is done).  Though feasible, using odometer readings as the means of collecting VMT 
fees would not allow charges to be linked to the facility type and location that each mile 
was driven on, and thus, make targeted fee scenarios impossible to implement.  Plus, 
there are many locations that do not have annual inspections.  However, in locations 
where annual vehicle inspections are required and where other technologies are not in 
place, use of odometer readings may be a more feasible, affordable option. 
Technology continues to improve and expand; thus, the possible use of several  
technology-based collection options exist, including the use of GPS units, video tolling 
using a license plate reader (LPR), and automatic vehicle identification (AVI) using a 
transponder (Wells, 2010).  A major concern with VMT fee collection technology is the 
cost of installation and subsequent collection.  The more frequently mileage information 
is collected, the more expensive the collection proposition.  In the case of a global 
positioning system (GPS) unit, the type of on-board unit (OBU) used for mileage 
tracking greatly affects the cost; with thick OBUs estimated at $650 and thin OBUs 
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estimated at $195 (Wells, 2010).  The term “thick” OBU is sometimes interchanged with 
the term “intelligent” OBU (Pickford and Blythe, 2006).  “Although the definitions of 
thick and intelligent have not been standardized, it is generally accepted that an OBU 
that estimates position and matches this to the terrestrial data of road segments is known 
as an intelligent client (Pickford and Blythe, 2006).”  Thick OBUs may also have the 
ability to internally keep track of the VMT fee price and subsequent total fees owed.  On 
the other hand, a thin OBU sends information to a data center that stores the information 
and later bills the owner of the vehicle (Hassan, 2007).  Thus, while the thin OBU itself 
is cheaper than the thick OBU, communication costs are higher when thin OBUs are 
implemented (Hassan, 2007).   
The additional cost of the thick OBU itself offers the added benefit of reduced 
privacy concerns; however, the process of updating mapping software is more 
complicated than for thin OBUs (Wells, 2010).  As suggested by Wells, OBU costs may 
be more justified if the point of the technology installation was not merely revenue 
based, but also facilitated the implementation of congestion pricing, emission fees, 
traffic data collection, and rates that vary based on road load-bearing capacity (Wells, 
2010).  The potential for VMT fee scenarios to not only address the issue of collecting 
revenue for the transportation infrastructure, but also to help mitigate congestion by 
creating incentives to travel during the off-peak hours, was previously described in the 
work of Rufolo and Kimpel (Rufolo and Kimpel, 2008).  Regardless of the VMT fee 
scenario, technology is not perfect and problems with collection and mileage reporting 
may arise; with problems being minimized as technology improves (Oh, Labi and Sinha, 
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2007); (Wells, 2010).  Research into developing an agile OBU that incorporates the best 
aspects of thin and thick OBUs has been performed and research into technology 
improvements are on-going (Hassan, 2007). 
Privacy concerns are often linked to the expanse of technology.  Individuals do 
not want to feel like they are constantly being watched and that their travel can be 
monitored.  This concern was voiced by Senate Environment and Public Works Chair, 
Barbara Boxer, in response to recommendations made by the National Surface 
Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission in how to address transportation 
funding needs.  According to an article by Koss that was paraphrasing Boxer, “[Boxer] 
would consider the study‟s recommendations on tolling, the roles of private and 
municipal investment in infrastructure upgrades, and switching to a „vehicle miles 
traveled‟ funding  fee in 2025, if privacy concerns are addressed (Koss, 2008).”  While it 
is understandable that individuals and policy-makers alike may be apprehensive about 
privacy concerns related to a VMT fee, these fears can be minimized by use of delayed 
GPS data reporting and minimal data storage.     
Environmental concerns are also an issue that may shape transportation fee 
structure development.  As previously mentioned, President Obama is pushing to 
increase the fuel economy standard of vehicles.  Referring to these new standards, The 
New York Times quotes Daniel Becker, director of the Safe Climate Campaign, as 
saying, “This is the single biggest step the American government has ever taken to cut 
greenhouse gas emissions (Broder, 2009).”  The transportation sector is the second 
leading contributor to greenhouse gas emissions—behind only the electric power sector 
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(Morrow, Gallagher, Collantes and Lee, 2010).  While policies that help reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector (largely stemming from carbon 
dioxide) are a benefit to the environment, the current gas tax system does not appear to 
be able to simultaneously remedy environmental concerns and revenue shortfalls.   
On the one hand it may be argued that a new transportation fee system should not 
penalize those who buy hybrids and other fuel-efficient vehicles by charging them the 
same fee assessed to less environmentally-friendly, low fuel-efficient vehicles.  After all, 
under the current gas tax system, the more fuel-efficient the vehicle, the less money paid 
in gas tax.  In addition to benefits at the pump, incentives have been attached to the 
purchase of alternative fueled vehicles.  Gallagher and Muehlegger researched hybrid 
incentives at the state level, using data from multiple states for the years 2000-2006.  
Interestingly, the authors found that, “The form of incentive is as important a factor in 
consumer adoption as incentive generosity (Gallagher and Muehlegger, 2010).”  The 
authors further state that, “The results suggest that immediacy, transparency, and ease 
may be important attributes when designing incentives meant to affect consumer 
behavior (Gallagher and Muehlegger, 2010).”  The same may be true of a transportation 
fee.  Not only should the total transportation fee amount be considered, but also the form 
in which it is charged.   
 
EQUITY 
According to Oh et al., “The criterion of equity is a measure of the fairness of a 
pricing scheme to different user groups (Oh, Labi and Sinha, 2007).”  User groups may 
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be defined by household income level, household geographic location, vehicle type 
classification, or roadway facility type (Zhang and McMullen, 2010); (Oh, Labi and 
Sinha, 2007).  As previously mentioned, Oh et al. addressed the issue of equity among 
roadway facility types; though not enough data were available to break the analysis 
down by vehicle class (Oh, Labi and Sinha, 2007).  The research presented within this 
thesis uses 2009 NHTS Texas data, which allows for an equity analysis that produces 
results disaggregated by household income level and household geographic location 
based on results obtained using vehicle fuel economy data. 
Equity pertains to multiple ideas presented among the VMT fee areas needing 
further research as suggested by the Joint Subcommittee on VMT Fee Revenues at the 
2011 TRB annual meeting (Regan, 2011).  Pertinent ideas include the following: 
 “Determine how various rates affect equity and fairness amongst motorist 
classes, and assess whether the general public accepts subsidies for certain 
classes such as rural drivers and poorer drivers (Regan, 2011).”   
 “Assess the socio-economic effects and the associated implications of moving 
from charging per gallon to charging by mile under various policy applications 
(Regan, 2011).” 
 “Conduct an assessment of equity issues, comparing the existing system with a 
mileage-based system, and research fairness concerns such as those related to 
urban versus rural interests and the affects of a mileage-based fee system on 
lower income drivers (Regan, 2011).” 
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It is not surprising that investigation into the equity impacts surrounding VMT 
fee scenarios has surfaced as a critical area of research that must be addressed prior to 
implementing a new transportation funding system that has the potential to generate 
billions of dollars of additional annual revenue.  Transportation projects often are 
required to address equity concerns.  In fact, all transportation projects that receive 
federal funding require an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS); part of which 
includes an assessment of the project‟s Environmental Justice.  As defined by the 
California Department of Transportation (Caltrans), “Environmental Justice in terms of 
transportation projects can be defined as the fair treatment and meaningful involvement 
of all people regardless of race, color, national origin or income, from the early stage of 
transportation planning and investment decision making through the construction, 
operations and maintenance (Caltrans, 2010).”  This supports investigation into the 
equity impacts of VMT fees with respect to household socioeconomic and geographic 
location variables; as was done in this research.  The following sections further define 
what equity is and provide examples of how equity has been addressed in past research. 
Horizontal Equity 
Two major subdivisions of equity exist; horizontal equity and vertical equity.  
Several different definitions of horizontal equity are found within the literature.  
According to Litman, “Horizontal equity is concerned with the distribution of impacts 
between individuals and groups considered equal in ability and need (Litman, 2002).”  In 
other words, horizontal equity suggests that, “public policies should avoid favoring one 
individual or group over others (Litman, 2002).”  As described by Toutkoushian and 
 22 
Michael, horizontal equity is the “equal treatment of equals (Toutkoushian and Michael, 
2007).”  Similarly, Taylor and Norton state that, “Horizontal equity considers how 
members of the same group (the elderly, bus riders, etc.) fare relative to one another 
(Taylor and Norton, 2009).”     
Vertical Equity 
 By contrast, “Vertical equity is concerned with the distribution of impacts 
between individuals and groups that differ in abilities and needs, in this case, by income 
or social class (Litman, 2002).”  This implies that in order for equity to exist, poor or 
disadvantaged individuals should be charged less than their more wealthy counterparts 
(Litman, 2002).  In other words, vertical equity suggests the “unequal treatment of 
unequals (Toutkoushian and Michael, 2007).”  The consideration of horizontal equity 
and vertical equity is not unique to the field of transportation (Toutkoushian and 
Michael, 2007).  However, within the transportation discipline there are a myriad of 
applications. 
Lorenz Curves (see Figure 1) and Gini Coefficients are common visual and 
quantitative methods respectively, used to assess vertical equity.  By definition, the line 
representing equity on a Lorenz Curve is bounded by (0,0) and (1,1) (Drezner, Drezner 
and Guyse, 2009).  Drezner et al. explain that the line of greatest equity is when “x% of 
the population has x% of the good (Drezner, Drezner and Guyse, 2009).”  Research into 
methods of approximating the Lorenz Curve (Ogwang and Gouranga Rao, 1996) and 
developing hybrid curve approximations has been performed (Ogwang and Rao, 2000).  
Similarly, the Gini Coefficient can range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating complete income 
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equality and 1 indicating complete income inequality (Rock, 1982).  Drezner et al. 
describe the calculation of the Gini Coefficient by stating, “The Gini coefficient (G) is 
the ratio of the area between the Lorenz Curve and the straight “equity” line to the entire 
area below the equity line with 0  G 1 (Drezner, Drezner and Guyse, 2009).”  This is 
shown mathematically in Equation (1) (see Figure 1). 
 
G=
BA
A

                                                                                                             (1) 
 
 
Figure 1. Lorenz curve plot (adjusted from a plot presented by Drezner, Drezner and 
Guyse, 2009) 
 
 
Closely related to the concept of Lorenz Curves is the Suit Index, often referred 
to as the S-Index.  Index values can range from -1 to 1; with -1 indicating absolute 
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regressivity, 0 indicating proportionality, and +1 indicating absolute progressivity.  
Litman defines the meaning of progressive and regressive by stating that, “Policies 
favoring disadvantaged groups are called progressive, while those that excessively 
burden disadvantaged people are called regressive (Litman, 2002).”  As stated by Rock, 
“To apply the S-index, families are ranked from lowest to highest income, and the 
accumulated percentage of tax burden associated with the corresponding accumulated 
percentage of income needs to be obtained (Rock, 1982).”  A visual representation of 
how the S-Index is used is shown in Figure 2; with the difference between a progressive 
tax and a regressive tax illustrated. Rock investigated the S-Index for several 
transportation financing alternatives using 1972-1973 Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Consumer Expenditure Survey data and found that most transportation financing options 
were regressive (Rock, 1982).        
 
 
Figure 2. Tax burden versus income (Rock, 1982) 
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Equity Research 
 Taylor and Norton give an extensive description of the different types of equity 
that can be defined and measured within transportation (Taylor and Norton, 2009).  They 
state that, “Equity gets defined quite differently by different interests at different times 
(Taylor and Norton, 2009).”  This is an important point to realize because in evaluating 
equity it must be understood what exactly is being evaluated in order to get clear, 
meaningful results and to allow for comparisons between different transportation 
revenue scenarios.  Another important point the authors discuss is the concept that as 
fees contributing towards transportation revenue become more and more distanced from 
a traveler‟s use of the transportation system, the less likely an individual is to consider 
the travel externalities they impose on the system when making decisions about trips 
(Taylor and Norton, 2009).  Although the current gas tax is somewhat linked to how 
much a traveler uses the transportation system, as vehicles become increasingly more 
fuel efficient, the connection between usage and fee will weaken.  A VMT system would 
help to solidify the concept that the more you use the transportation system, the more 
you pay.  Taylor and Norman go on to list trips, passenger miles traveled, and a per 
capita basis as three common reference units used to evaluate equity—emphasizing that 
the reference units selected greatly impact the equity results (Taylor and Norton, 2009).  
Similarly, three main units of analysis exist—geographic, group, and individual.  The 
geographic unit is commonly used by elected officials in the consideration of equity; the 
group unit is often used by advocates and activists; and the unit of individual is the 
typical domain of social science scholars (Taylor and Norton, 2009).    
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 Lari and Iacono investigated vertical equity issues using data from the Twin City 
area of Minnesota.  The authors describe vertical equity as relating to “the equity of a 
policy with respect to groups of users with different economic circumstances (ability to 
pay) (Lari and Iacono, 2006).”  Interestingly, they note that, “Among the taxes used to 
finance transportation, most are moderately regressive, with the motor fuel tax being the 
most regressive (Lari and Iacono, 2006).”  However, the authors also found that higher 
income households generally make not only more trips but also longer trips.  Thus, in 
order to make funding the infrastructure less regressive, the authors propose shifting 
more towards fees, such as the motor fuel tax, that are more closely related to use of the 
system and move away from taxes that are not closely linked to usage (Lari and Iacono, 
2006).  VMT fees may be even more closely linked to usage than the motor fuel tax.  
One of the objectives of this thesis was to investigate the validity of this statement by 
comparing the distributional equity impacts of the current state gas tax in Texas to 
several VMT fee scenarios.   
Evaluating Equity 
Based on the equity definitions and research presented to this point, it is evident 
that there are many different available methods to evaluate equity (Lorenz Curves, Gini 
Coefficients, Suit Index, etc.).  The Gini Coefficient was used in this analysis to 
quantitatively evaluate the vertical equity of each VMT fee scenario relative to the 
vertical equity of the current state gas tax.  Due to such subtle differences in Lorenz 
Curve points for each scenario, it was determined that this type of visual representation 
would not be as effective as a mathematical comparison (the Gini Coefficient).  
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However, as a point of reference, the Lorenz Curve for the Texas state gas tax is shown 
in Figure 3.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As for the Suit Index, household income level data were only available in an 
aggregated form.  Therefore, it would not have been possible to rank individual 
households by household income level and would have yielded results similar to the 
Lorenz Curve.  Chapter IV includes and discusses the Gini Coefficients calculated in this 
research.  
Another important point to note in the evaluation of equity within this analysis is 
how the terms “progressive” and “regressive” were used.  As suggested previously, the 
term regressive generally implies that low income households spend a higher percentage 
Figure 3. Lorenz curve for Texas state gas tax in 2008 
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of their total household income on a specific fee category.  However, given that for all 
VMT fee scenarios included in this analysis it was assumed that the VMT fee would 
only replace the state gas tax (which is merely a fraction of the overall price of gasoline), 
regressivity comparisons did not consider overall changes.  Rather, this analysis focused 
more on the relative change in the weighted average amount collected under the current 
state gas tax compared to each VMT fee scenario.  In other words, the interest was in 
whether a given VMT fee scenario placed a higher percent burden on low income 
households (defined to be more regressive) or more of a burden on high income 
households (defined to be more progressive) than the current state gas tax.  
Horizontal equity was evaluated by comparing the percent of the total state gas 
tax or VMT fee assessed to urban households versus rural households.  Scenario 4, 
which was briefly described in Chapter I, was designed to create horizontal equity—
establishing different VMT fees for different roadway types by assuming the percent of 
urban household and rural household VMT and charging a rate that would raise funds 
needed for the corresponding shared improvement costs (needed for both urban 
roadways and rural roadways) or infrastructure and mobility costs unique to a given 
roadway type (Texas 2030 Committee, 2009).  With Scenario 4 deemed to display 
perfect horizontal equity, all other scenarios—including the current state gas tax—were 
compared to this standard in order to determine their relative horizontal equity.   
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MODEL SELECTION:  STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC 
Though many different types of models can be used to assess the equity impacts 
of a VMT fee, each model broadly falls into either the category of static or dynamic.  A 
good example of where both types of models were used to assess equity can be seen in 
research conducted by Zhang and McMullen (Zhang and McMullen, 2010).  Data used 
by Zhang and McMullen were obtained from the 2001 Oregon National Household 
Travel Survey (NHTS) data.  Four-hundred seven Oregon households were included in 
the survey; though only households containing all of the relevant information needed for 
a given model were included within the analysis of that model (Zhang and McMullen, 
2010).  Zhang and McMullen tested a flat VMT fee, along with two “green VMT fee” 
scenarios based on vehicle fuel economy; considering equity impacts based on 
household income levels and geographic locations in Oregon, through the use of four 
different models—static, regression, simultaneous, and discrete.  A distinguishing 
feature of the static model is that it “assumes no behavioral changes by vehicle owners in 
response to the change in tax, which essentially assumes that the price elasticity of 
demand for miles is zero (Zhang and McMullen, 2010).”  The static model is also the 
easiest for elected officials to understand (Zhang and McMullen, 2010).   
The other models Zhang and McMullen considered are dynamic in nature.  The 
regression model assumes that several factors, including “fuel cost per mile, household 
income, household location, number of vehicles currently owned by the household, and a 
vector of other household characteristics” affect the miles a household drives (Zhang and 
McMullen, 2010).  The simultaneous model assumes that the number of vehicles a 
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household owns, those vehicles‟ fuel economies, and the number of vehicle miles driven 
are interconnected and decided simultaneously with a change in the transportation fee.  
The discrete model considers the effects of changes in both vehicle quantity and vehicle 
type; with the two behaviors determined independently (Zhang and McMullen, 2010).  
The authors found that the static model overestimated revenue increases for their 
scenarios labeled 1 and 2; though not in a uniform manner among income groups, which 
produced biased distributional effects (Zhang and McMullen, 2010).  However, given 
the relatively small changes caused by alterations to the transportation fee, the long-term 
behavioral changes are relatively minimal.  Thus, it may not be worth the extra time and 
money to develop and use a model that considers long-term behavioral changes in 
response to a VMT fee scenario being implemented (Zhang and McMullen, 2010).   
When deciding whether to use a static model or a dynamic model when modeling 
the short-term travel impacts of a VMT fee, the researcher should consider the ultimate 
purpose of the model.  If it is vital that elected officials be able to easily understand the 
results, a static model may be advisable.  However, if useful and relevant price 
elasticities are available, doing a comparison of static and dynamic results could be 
beneficial; but an important caveat to consider in the design of dynamic models is 
balancing simplicity with fit.  In other words, even though a highly complex dynamic 
model may have the potential to consider a host of variables—and thus generate output 
that more accurately mirrors traveler response—the usefulness of the output may be 
masked by its complexity.  Therefore, the researcher should use common sense and 
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strive to achieve the proper balance between creating a detailed model and creating a 
useful model.  
For the purposes of this research, both static and dynamic results were obtained 
and compared for each scenario.  Elasticities used in the dynamic model were 
disaggregated by both household income level and household geographic location 
(Wadud, Graham and Noland, 2009).  The dynamic model assumed that no households 
would change their vehicle fleet composition due to changes in the transportation fee.  
Rather, under the dynamic model, a short-term response was assumed—implying that 
the only change brought about by the change in transportation fee was a change in a 
vehicle‟s VMT.  Further discussion on the elasticities used in the dynamic model is 
provided in Chapter IV.     
 
TEXAS INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS 
One of the most important factors motivating the study of VMT fees is the need 
to obtain more funding to support the maintenance and improvement of Texas‟s 
infrastructure.  Funding for highways is a major concern.  As of 2003, Texas estimates 
were put at, “a staggering $179-billion transportation need in the next 25 years [and] 
another $79 billion needed to alleviate peak hour demand (Powers, 2004).”   
Concerns about revenue available for Texas‟s infrastructure have been voiced 
throughout the past decade.  In 2007, Ric Williamson, Texas Transportation 
Commissioner, was quoted as saying, “The estimated revenue from the state gas tax does 
not even cover our state‟s maintenance budget for the next biennium (Williamson, 
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2007).”  The fact that the transportation sector is competing for funding with so many 
other worthwhile causes increases the difficulty in successfully championing the effort to 
increase transportation funds.  However, there are many factors that contribute to the 
importance of the transportation infrastructure quality; among them travel time, travel 
comfort, vehicle maintenance needs, and safety. 
Receiving funding needed for the infrastructure is not the only issue to consider; 
a plan of how available funds will be used is also necessary for success.  On the state 
level, this is closely linked to the Statewide Transportation Improvement Program 
(STIP), which includes a plan detailing which projects will receive federal funding for a 
given range of fiscal years.  The Transportation Improvement Plan (TIP) for each 
transportation district within the state is compiled into the statewide document known as 
the STIP.  For instance, in Texas, the Bryan District TIP for fiscal years 2008-2011 
details projects slated to receive federal funding, the budgeted amount for that project, 
and all highway or transit categories that apply to the project (Texas Department of 
Transportation, 2007).  It is important that states have a plan in place of how money for 
the transportation infrastructure, once received, will be used.  Concerns over this issue 
surfaced in the shipping industry in early 2009 as the federal government made plans to 
allocate $85 billion to $150 billion dollars to infrastructure improvements.  Many did not 
feel that an adequate plan was in place on how states should use this allocated money 
(Hoffman, 2009).   
As mentioned in the brief overview given of Scenario 2 in Chapter I, a committee 
was formed to address the 2030 infrastructure needs of Texas.  The results of the efforts 
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of the Committee represent progress towards effectively allocating resources if and when 
they are received.  The paper summarizing the findings of the Committee states that, “As 
a result of use and age, Texas‟ highway infrastructure is showing signs of deterioration 
(Texas 2030 Committee, 2009).”  Infrastructure deterioration issues are in and of 
themselves cause for concern, but additional problems are also linked to infrastructure 
needs.  The summary goes on to say that, “Driving on roads that are in disrepair 
accelerates vehicle deterioration, escalates roadway maintenance costs and increases fuel 
consumption (Texas 2030 Committee, 2009).”  Thus, charging a VMT fee in place of the 
current state gas tax would not only hold motorists accountable for their use of the 
infrastructure, but may actually decrease money wasted on fuel during congestion.  The 
Committee established investment levels needed to reach both mobility and 
infrastructure goals.  For 2009-2030, an annual investment of $14.3 billion is needed to 
fund improvements to pavements, bridges, urban mobility, rural mobility, and safety 
(Texas 2030 Committee, 2009).  Given that this is a staggering amount of revenue—
especially when considering that state highway fund revenue coming from motor fuel 
tax allocations in the year 2008 totaled $2.3 billion (Combs, 2011)—it is important to 
plan for how this additional revenue could be generated.  Scenarios 2-4 included in this 
analysis were designed to generate these additional funds—as further described in 
Chapter IV.   
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SUMMARY 
 As evidenced by a review of the literature, further investigation into VMT fees is 
both timely and critical given their potential to help address Texas‟s infrastructure and 
mobility needs.  Past case studies and reviews outlining VMT fee concerns provide a 
framework for future study.  Equity is one of the important issues that should be 
addressed.  This research effort compared the equity impacts related to four proposed 
VMT fee scenarios, as well as the current state gas tax, as further described in Chapters 
III, IV, and V.   
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CHAPTER III 
DATA MERGING, FILTERING, AND WEIGHTING  
 
The data used in this research effort were obtained from the 2009 NHTS dataset.  
Data pertinent to Texas were obtained from information supplied as part of Texas‟s Add-
on participation in the 2009 NHTS.  Permission to use these data was granted by the 
Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) and the Texas Department of Transportation 
(TxDOT).  Some additional variables used in the analysis were obtained from Version 
2.1 of the 2009 NHTS dataset provided through the NHTS website (http://nhts.ornl.gov/ 
index.shtml).  It was necessary to merge variables obtained from both the Texas Add-on 
deliverables and Version 2.1 of the NHTS publically available dataset.  The data were 
then filtered to only include survey data for vehicle records containing all of the 
information deemed necessary for analysis.  After filtering was implemented, the data 
were weighted to reflect all 2008 Texas vehicle-owning households; with a distinction 
made between urban households and rural households.  This chapter further describes 
the NHTS dataset, and explains the data merging, data filtering, and data weighting 
processes. 
 
NHTS   
 The NHTS is a large-scale, nationwide survey that provides planners and 
researchers with information relevant to the travel patterns of Americans, as well as 
demographic information that may affect travel (U.S. Department of Transportation, 
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2010) (see Appendix A for the 2009 NHTS Household Screener Interview and Appendix 
B for the 2009 NHTS Extended Interview).  Some form of the NHTS has been 
administered every five to seven years since 1969 (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
2004)—with the most recent NHTS being conducted from March 2008 to May 2009 
(U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, 2011).  Its two 
predecessor surveys—the National Personal Transportation Survey (NPTS) which 
focused on short trips and the American Travel Survey (ATS) which focused on long 
trips—were first combined in 2001 (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 2004).  However, 
the 2009 NHTS moved away from the collection of detailed information about long-
distance trips—which is one example of how although common threads exist between 
each NHTS and its predecessors, each new survey reflects changes from past surveys 
(U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, 2011).  Previous 
data collected through the NHTS and its predecessors have been used in the study of a 
wide range of topics (Zhang and McMullen, 2010); (Pucher and Renne, 2004); (Tal and 
Handy, 2010); (Ouimet, Simons-Morton, Zador, Lerner, Freedman, Duncan and Wang, 
2010); (Collia, Sharp and Giesbrecht, 2003).  
 In the 2009 NHTS, over 150,000 households nationwide were included.  Many of 
these were obtained as part of Add-on surveys sponsored by various agencies, often state 
DOTs (U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, 2011).  As 
the largest Add-on constituent, TxDOT paid for roughly 20,000 additional household 
surveys to be performed in Texas, beyond those already included as part of the national 
sample (U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, 2011).  
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The data distributed to the Add-on participants were classified into five files; namely 
person, household, vehicle, trip, and location (Federal Highway Administration, 2009); 
with common variables amongst the files making it possible to merge data between the 
files.  The vehicle files included as part of Version 2.1 and the Texas Add-on specific 
data contained all of the Add-on data relevant to this research.  Pertinent variables and 
their definition are presented in Table 1. 
 
 Table 1. Relevant NHTS Variables and Descriptions 
NHTS Variable Variable Definition 
ANNMILES Self-reported annualized mile estimate 
CMPLTPCT Percent of household members that completed the interview 
EIADMPG EIA derived miles per gasoline-equivalent gallon estimate 
FUELTYPE Type of fuel 
GCOST Fuel cost in nominal US dollars per gasoline-equivalent gallon 
HHFAMINC Derived total household income 
HH_HISP Hispanic status of household respondent 
HHSIZE Count of household members 
HHSTATE State household location 
HH_RACE Race of household respondent 
HHVEHCNT Count of household vehicles 
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Table 1. cont. 
NHTS Variable Variable Definition 
HOUSEID Household eight-digit ID number 
HYBRID Vehicle is hybrid or uses alternate fuel 
LIF_CYC Life cycle classification for the household 
URBRUR Household in urban/rural area 
VEHTYPE Vehicle type 
VEHYEAR Vehicle model year 
 
 
MERGING THE DATA 
 Some of the variables relevant to this analysis were specific to the Texas Add-on 
vehicle file, while other variables were filtered from the vehicle file of Version 2.1 of the 
2009 NHTS dataset obtained from the NHTS website (http://nhts.ornl.gov/index.shtml).  
It was necessary to merge variables from both datasets.  The files were matched based 
on the unique HOUSEID variable. 
For the most part, conformity between common variables was realized.  
However, the coding of some variables was redefined in Version 2.1; contributing to 
some differences in values found between the datasets.  Most notably, Version 2.1 of the 
national dataset aggregated VEHYEAR for all vehicles built between 1924 to1984 by 
simply displaying the year 1974 for all such vehicles.  This change largely stemmed 
from a lack of dependable fuel economy data provided for vehicles built prior to 1985.  
An additional reason for this vehicle year aggregation stemmed from a desire to protect 
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against the potential for confidential responses and information being linked to a specific 
household in cases where very few households share a given household or vehicle 
characteristic.  Vehicles with years ranging from 1924-1984 compose only a small 
percentage of the total vehicles included within the 2009 NHTS, and an even smaller 
percentage of total ANNMILES (see Table 2).  Therefore, aggregation of vehicle years 
prior to 1985 for the purposes of fuel economy reporting had little effect on the analysis.   
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of Un-weighted Number of Vehicles and their Associated VMT by 
Vehicle Year after Initial Filtering 
Vehicles 
Included 
Number of 
Vehicles 
Percentage of 
Total Vehicles 
After Filtering 
VMT 
Percentage of  
Total VMT 
Vehicle Years 
from 1924-1984: 
838 2.87 2,468,701 0.80 
Vehicle Years 
from 1985-2009: 
28,324 97.13 305,996,862 99.20 
All Vehicle Years  
from 1924-2009: 
29,162 100.00 308,465,563 100.00 
  
  
 These 29,162 vehicles remaining after filtering were used in the analysis.  The 
filtering process is explained in the next section.  All information related specifically to 
the NHTS vehicles was taken from Version 2.1 of the publically available NHTS data.  
Thus, although a relatively small percentage of vehicles displayed discrepancies in 
vehicle type (824 vehicles, 2.8 percent of vehicles) and vehicle model code (1,198 
vehicles, 4.1 percent of vehicles), this was a non-issue that stemmed from slight coding 
differences between data sources.  In other words, based on these checks it was assumed 
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that all of the vehicle variable matches made between the two NHTS sources 
corresponded to information on the same vehicle. 
 
FILTERING THE DATA 
 After merging relevant variables from both the 2009 Texas Add-on deliverables 
and the vehicle file of Version 2.1 of the 2009 publically available NHTS data, the next 
step was to filter the original data.  Filtering was done to ensure that the households 
being considered in the analysis were complete enough to allow for the analysis of the 
four scenarios to be implemented and analyzed.  The initial filtering that was 
implemented is shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Initial Filtering Specifications 
Variable Filter Specification Further Filter Explanation 
CMPLTCT Equal to 1 
Ensuring household 100% 
complete (i.e., all adults in 
household interviewed) 
HHFAMINC Greater than or equal to 1 Ensuring HHFAMINC was listed 
HYBRID Not equal to -7, -8, -9 
Ensuring HYBRID response 
was not “Refused”, “Don‟t 
Know”, or “Not Ascertained” 
respectively 
VEHYEAR Greater than 0 Ensuring vehicle year was listed 
HHSTATE Equal to TX Ensuring HHTATE was marked as Texas 
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Table 3. cont. 
Variable Filter Specification Further Filter Explanation 
FUELTYPE Equal to 4 Ensuring FUELTYPE was listed as Motor Gasoline 
ANNMILES Not equal to -1, -7, -8, -9 Ensuring ANNMILES was listed 
URBRUR Not equal to -9 Ensuring URBRUR was listed 
HH_RACE Not equal to -7, -8, -9 
Ensuring HH_RACE response 
was not “Refused”, “Don‟t 
Know”, or “Not Ascertained” 
respectively 
HH_HISP Not equal to -7, -8 Ensuring HH_HISP was listed 
VEHTYPE Not equal to -8, -9, 8, 97 
Ensuring VEHTYPE values 
remaining were listed as 
1,2,3,4,6 or 7 
 
 
This filtering process left 32,113 vehicles and 16,315 households.  With this 
initial filtering done, it left some households with fewer vehicles remaining than the 
number of vehicles listed under the variable HHVEHCNT.  These 1,720 households 
were eliminated.  Thus, no vehicles associated with households containing vehicles with 
incomplete information or irrelevant vehicle types were included in the analysis.  This 
filtering requirement ensured that the average transportation fee calculated for a given 
household classification (i.e., 0 Employees, Household Size 2, Income Level 3) was not 
biased downward by only including some of the gasoline-run, pertinent vehicles 
belonging to a household.  For example, consider a household owning two gasoline-run 
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vehicles but only having one vehicle available for analysis after initial filtering.  If their 
one remaining household vehicle were included in the analysis, the average annual 
transportation fee calculated for this household would be lower than reality because the 
vehicles miles driven in their second vehicle would not be included in the calculations.  
On the other hand, it may be argued that by eliminating vehicles corresponding 
to households with at least one of their vehicles filtered out, the results were biased 
downward because the more vehicles a household owned, the more likely it was that at 
least one of their vehicles was eliminated through filtering.  However, households with a 
large number of vehicles were not common (see Table 4).  Therefore, it was assumed 
that this latter concern was minimal compared to the alternative of including vehicles 
from households no longer having all of their vehicles after filtering.   
 
Table 4. Number of 2008 Texas Households by HHVEHCNT 
HHVEHCNT 
Number of 
Households Prior to 
Any Filtering 
Number of 
Households After 
Initial Filtering 
Number of 
Households After 
Eliminating 
Households Where 
HHVEHCNT Did Not 
Match The Number 
of Vehicle Records 
Remaining 
0 17 0 0 
1 5,838 4,465 4,465 
2 10,052 7,721 6,919 
3 3,776 2,866 2,330 
4 1,188 872 626 
5 375 267 184 
6 117 88 59 
7 29 22 7 
8 10 8 4 
9 3 2 0 
10 2 1 1 
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Table 4. cont. 
HHVEHCNT 
Number of 
Households Prior to 
Any Filtering 
Number of 
Households After 
Initial Filtering 
Number of 
Households After 
Eliminating 
Households Where 
HHVEHCNT Did 
Not Match The 
Number of Vehicle 
Records Remaining 
11 2 2 0 
12 0 0 0 
13 1 1 0 
Total 21,410 16,315 14,595 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 4, 17 households had vehicle information provided, even 
though their HHVEHCNT value corresponded to 0.  Initially, this finding seemed 
counter-intuitive.  However, as clarified by Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) 
NHTS statisticians, this result was caused by differences in definition of what defines a 
household vehicle.  “Vehicles” such as jet skis and snowmobiles were considered 
household vehicles and thus information on them was included in the vehicle file.  
However, when defining HHVEHCNT, a listed vehicle was only included in the count if 
it was a motorized vehicle that could be driven on streets and highways.  Therefore, golf 
carts and vehicles with vehicle types described as “Other” were not included within the 
HHVEHCNT summation.  As can be seen from Table 4, those households with a 
HHVEHCNT value of 0 were automatically eliminated during the initial filtering 
process.  Households in a similar situation, where more vehicle records were initially 
provided than the HHVEHCNT value reflected (i.e. three vehicle records were provided 
for the households but the HHVEHCNT had a value of 2) would have been eliminated 
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by the final filtering step if all vehicles remained after initial filtering.  However, as in 
the example provided, if one of the three vehicles was eliminated during the initial 
filtering process, that household and its remaining vehicles would remain in the analysis 
(since HHVEHCNT would now match the number of vehicle records).  It was assumed 
that this situation was rare, and that in many such cases the vehicle record removed 
during the initial filtering process was in fact the vehicle record not initially counted in 
the HHVEHCNT.  A summary of the number of households and the number of vehicles 
remaining after each filtering step is provided in Table 5.  
 
 
Table 5. Filtering Process and Associated Number of Households and Number of 
Vehicles 
Filtering Step Number of Households Number of Vehicles 
Prior to Any Filtering 21,410 45,122 
After Initial Filtering to Only 
Include Vehicles with All 
Information Deemed Necessary 
16,315 32,113 
After Removal of Vehicles 
Belonging to Households No 
Longer Listing All Vehicles After 
Prior Filtering 
14,595 29,162 
 
 
After the filtering process there were 779 hybrid vehicles left in the dataset (see 
Table 6).  Hybrid vehicles equate to 2.7 percent of the vehicles included in the analysis.  
Although this is a relatively small percentage, it is anticipated that advances in hybrid 
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technology will cause hybrids to become more widespread in the future.  Thus, their 
inclusion in this analysis was important.  
 
Table 6. Number of Hybrid Vehicles and Non-Hybrid Vehicles after Proper Filtering 
Hybrid Vehicles 779 
Non-Hybrid Vehicles 28,383 
Total 29,162 
  
 
One-hundred and thirty-seven of the 29,162 vehicles included in the analysis did 
not include an EIADMPG fuel economy.  To remedy this fact, the average un-weighted 
fuel economy of each vehicle type was calculated based on those vehicles with a 
provided EIADMPG fuel economy (see Table 7).  The VEHTYPE variable was supplied 
within the NHTS data—making this process relatively simple.  Hybrid vehicles were 
considered to be their own vehicle type.  Two logical methods of calculating the average 
fuel economy by vehicle type were possible; either the weighted or the un-weighted 
sample average fuel economy of matched vehicles could be used.  An explanation of 
how the un-weighted and weighted fuel economy of each vehicle type was calculated is 
shown in Equation (2) and Equation (3) respectively.   
 
VehType
VehType
NUMVEH
EIADMPG          
Economy Fuel Avg. weightedUn

                                   (2) 
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where 
EIADMPG≠-9 
NUMVEH=Number of vehicles included in the survey 
 
VehType=Type of vehicle 
 
 
Economy Fuel Avg. Wegihted                                   (3) 
=

 
VehType
VehType
WEIGHT          
)WEIGHT(EIADMPG
                            
where 
WEIGHT=Weight calculated for each vehicle so that the sum of the 
weighted households adds-up up to desired control totals for all vehicle-
owning household in Texas in the year 2008 
 
 
  
Both methods of calculating the average fuel economy of each vehicle type were 
compared.  From Table 7 it is apparent that the difference between the un-weighted and 
the weighted results is minimal.  Thus, the un-weighted average was used to fill-in the 
corresponding originally blank EIADMPG fuel economies.  Therefore, the dataset 
consisted of 14,595 Texas households with 29,162 vehicles.  As previously mentioned, 
almost all vehicles records (29,025) included the vehicle fuel economy in the 2009 
NHTS; with 137 vehicle fuel economies calculated based on the average fuel economy 
for that vehicle type.  Recall that only gasoline-run (or at least partially gasoline-run) 
vehicles were included in this analysis.  
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Table 7. Comparison of Un-weighted Average Fuel Economy and Weighted Average 
Fuel Economy 
NHTS 
VEHTYPE 
VEHTYPE 
Code 
Number of 
Vehicles 
Included 
After 
Filtering 
with Listed 
EIADMPG 
Un-weighted 
Average Fuel 
Economy 
Based on 
Those 
Sample 
Vehicles with 
a Paired 
EIADMPG 
Fuel 
Economy 
(MPG) 
Weighted 
Average Fuel 
Economy 
Based on 
Those 
Sample 
Vehicles with 
a Paired 
EIADMPG 
Fuel 
Economy 
(MPG) 
Differences 
Between Un-
weighted 
Average Fuel 
Economy 
and 
Weighted 
Average Fuel 
Economy 
(MPG) 
Automobile/ 
Car/Station 
Wagon 
01 12,637 22.56 23.05 -0.49 
Van (Mini, 
Cargo, 
Passenger) 
02 2,048 19.08 19.03 0.05 
Sports Utility 
Vehicle 03 6,052 17.68 17.72 -0.04 
Pickup Truck 04 6,657 16.24 16.45 -0.21 
RV 
(Recreational 
Vehicle) 
06 138 6.4 6.4 0 
Motorcycle 07 714 56.5 56.5 0 
Hybrid HYBRID=1 779 26.44 26.12 0.32 
All Vehicles NA 29,025 20.71 20.96 -0.25 
 
  
WEIGHTING THE DATA 
 The next step in preparing the data for analysis was weighing the data.  The goal 
was to develop weights such that the data reflected vehicle-owning Texas households in 
the year 2008 disaggregated by 
 a)  Household Income Level (5 classes) 
 b)  Household Size (1 to 4+) 
 c)  Number of Household Employees (0,1,2+) 
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 d)  Household Geographic Location (Urban, Rural) 
The criterion of household income level, household size, and number of 
household employees is a fairly standard weighting approach used in Texas survey data 
analysis.  Further disaggregation by household geographic location was necessary in 
order to effectively use elasticities needed for the dynamic models, which were 
disaggregated not only by household income level, but also by the household‟s 
geographic location classification.   
A small percentage of Texas vehicle-owning households may only own vehicles 
that are powered by a source of energy other than gasoline.  While it is difficult to 
accurately estimate the exact percentage of households that fit into this category, the fact 
that only 739 household vehicles of the 45,122 household vehicles included in the 2008 
Texas survey (1.6 percent) have a fuel type other than gasoline (which contribute less 
than 2.0 percent of the reported ANNMILES for Texas vehicles included in the 2009 
NHTS) indicates that fuel type of household vehicles is predominantly gasoline.  It was 
assumed that the percentage of households only owning vehicles that run on a source of 
energy other than gasoline would be even smaller because households that own multiple 
vehicles become increasingly more likely to own at least one gasoline-powered vehicle.  
Therefore, it was assumed that the percentage of Texas households only owning vehicles 
powered by a source of energy other than gasoline was minimal.  Thus, the 2008 Texas 
vehicle-owning household control totals could be used to weight results with little 
negative effect. 
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 In order to create weights that could be applied to each sub-cell within both the 
urban household and rural household 3-way cross-classification tables, it was necessary 
to determine the total number of 2008 Texas households with these characteristics.  
Given the multiple disaggregated classifications that were desired, it was not possible to 
obtain a pre-made table meeting every household characteristic disaggregation 
requirement.  However, some useful control totals were obtained using the American 
Fact Finder website (http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en), which 
supplies information from a number of surveys—including the American Community 
Survey (ACS).  The control totals that were obtained from 2008 ACS 1-Year Estimates 
are shown in Table 8.  The ACS table numbers from which the control totals were 
obtained are also provided. 
 
Table 8. List and Description of ACS Tables Used to Get Control Values Used in 
Weighting 
Table Name Description of Control Total 
B08201.  HOUSEHOLD SIZE BY VEHICLES 
AVAILABLE-Universe:  HOUSEHOLDS 
Total number of 2008 Texas vehicle-owning 
households by household size and household 
urban/rural classification. 
B08203.  NUMBER OF WORKERS IN 
HOUSEHOLD BY VEHICLES AVAILABLE-
Universe:  HOUSEHOLDS 
Total number of 2008 Texas vehicle-owning 
households by number of household workers 
and household urban/rural classification. 
 
 
 A summary of the two types of control totals used for both urban vehicle-owning 
households (see Table 9 and Table 10) and rural vehicle-owning households (see Table 
11 and Table 12) is provided below. 
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Table 9. Urban Vehicle-Owning Household Number of Employed Household Members 
Control Total Values 
Control Total Type Control Total Value 
0 Employed Household 1,065,731 Households 
1 Employed Household 2,763,161 Households 
2+ Employed Household 2,370,977 Households 
All Urban Vehicle-Owning Households 6,199,869 Households 
 
 
 
 
Table 10. Urban Vehicle-Owning Households by Household Size Control Total Values 
Control Total Type Control Total Value 
Household Size 1 1,544,414 Households 
Household Size 2 1,877,375 Households 
Household Size 3 1,048,873 Households 
Household Size 4+ 1,729,207 Households 
All Urban Vehicle-Owning Households 6,199,869 Households 
 
 
 
 
Table 11. Rural Vehicle-Owning Household Number of Employed Household Members 
Control Total Values 
Control Total Type Control Total Value 
0 Employed Household 359,356 Households 
1 Employed Household 643,533 Households 
2+ Employed Household 711,565 Households 
All Rural Vehicle-Owning Households 1,714,454 Households 
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Table 12. Rural Vehicle-Owning Households by Household Size Control Total Values 
Control Total Type Control Total Value 
Household Size 1 317,451 Households 
Household Size 2 613,235 Households 
Household Size 3 288,366 Households 
Household Size 4+ 495,402 Households 
All Rural Vehicle-Owning Households 1,714,454 Households 
 
  
Tables indicating the number of urban and rural vehicle-owning households by 
size and employed household members were available.  Unfortunately, the desired 
control totals showing the number of urban and rural vehicle-owning households in 
terms of household income level were not available.  Therefore, it was necessary to 
make an initial assumption regarding the household income distribution for both urban 
households and rural households.   
One option was to assume that the ratio of urban households to rural households 
was the same for all sub-cells within the 3-way classification.  However, this goes 
against logic because household income level likely varies with household size, the 
number of household employees, and whether the household is urban or rural.  Another 
option was to assume that the same household income ratio for urban households and 
rural households that existed in the surveyed households after filtering was applied was 
identical to the household income distribution of the population.  However, this 
approach was not chosen because inherently, surveys cannot ensure that every possible 
demographic or household characteristic of interest is captured in exact proportion to the 
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population as a whole.  Even if the true disaggregation could be captured within the 
survey, the fact that households and vehicles originally included in the 2009 NHTS 
dataset were filtered to ensure that all of the desired variables were available prior to 
analysis would distort the original ratio of households in each sub-cell. 
 Preliminary results using the two weighting methods described thus far were 
calculated for comparison purposes.  Not surprisingly, the results within each sub-cell of 
the two 3-way tables varied noticeably between the two methods—demonstrating the 
importance of the selected weighting methodology.  Thus, a third method, thought to be 
a better basis for estimating the household income distribution of 2008 Texas vehicle-
owning households, was employed.  This method involved using the household weights 
provided as a variable within Version 2.1 of the NHTS data.  The household weights 
associated with all households that did not have a HHVEHCNT value of 0 were summed 
for each category within the 3-way cross-classification table.  This became the starting 
point for the raking process (an iterative process of smoothing data to simultaneously fit 
multiple control total criteria); which involved iteratively making the ACS control totals 
for household size and number of household employees match.  See Table 13 and Table 
14 for the summed household weights used as a starting point for urban vehicle-owning 
households and rural vehicle-owning households respectively.  
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Table 13. Starting Point for Urban Vehicle-Owning Households (Based on Sum of 
Household Weights for Non 0 HHVEHCNT Households) 
0 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 240,416.73 150,856.66 44,891.64 89,018.47 525,183.50 
20-40 139,475.10 123,858.01 23,752.15 40,555.05 327,640.32 
40-60 50,819.29 72,688.70 10,236.50 14,887.46 148,631.94 
60-100 23,723.47 59,838.50 7,022.13 10,685.73 101,269.84 
100+ 11,486.78 40,122.11 8,456.51 13,943.71 74,009.10 
Total 465,921.36 447,363.97 94,358.94 169,090.43 1,176,734.71 
1 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 155,581.25 119,262.09 90,345.85 196,571.79 561,760.97 
20-40 311,905.79 168,439.93 117,789.87 197,996.24 796,131.83 
40-60 223,881.16 163,140.93 76,471.66 89,598.96 553,092.71 
60-100 204,484.32 153,887.90 102,232.55 115,580.04 576,184.82 
100+ 880,28.94 143,682.18 71,395.58 115,731.06 418,837.76 
Total 983,881.46 748,413.02 458,235.52 715,478.09 2,906,008.09 
2+ Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 NA 28,535.00 42,508.52 110,987.24 182,030.75 
20-40 NA 69,461.09 66,271.16 148,607.70 284,339.95 
40-60 NA 117,722.95 81,071.00 127,076.43 325,870.37 
60-100 NA 175,059.24 161,880.16 192,795.88 529,735.28 
100+ NA 213,348.64 157,253.18 207,897.96 578,499.78 
Total NA 604,126.91 508,984.01 787,365.21 1,900,476.13 
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Table 13. cont. 
Total Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 395,997.97 298,653.74 177,746.01 396,577.50 1,268,975.23 
20-40 451,380.90 361,759.02 207,813.18 387,158.99 1,408,112.09 
40-60 274,700.45 353,552.57 167,779.16 231,562.85 1,027,595.03 
60-100 228,207.79 388,785.64 271,134.85 319,061.66 1,207,189.94 
100+ 99,515.72 397,152.92 237,105.26 337,572.73 1,071,346.63 
Total 1,449,802.82 1,799,903.90 1,061,578.46 1,671,933.74 5,983,218.92 
 
 
 
 
Table 14. Starting Point for Rural Vehicle-Owning Households (Based on Sum of 
Household Weights for Non 0 HHVEHCNT Households) 
0 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 57,351.40 38,236.35 7,647.84 9,550.06 112,785.64 
20-40 28,973.55 43,592.13 3,749.70 7,214.37 83,529.75 
40-60 10,163.77 24,890.83 1,693.05 4,297.14 41,044.80 
60-100 6,375.91 20,404.10 3,600.27 6,014.87 36,395.15 
100+ 2,827.83 10,986.78 1,593.93 3,432.33 18,840.86 
Total 105,692.45 138,110.18 18,284.78 30,508.79 292,596.20 
1 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 37,677.85 21,810.47 22,699.69 26,834.36 109,022.36 
20-40 55,354.38 45,452.69 19,316.89 35,771.61 155,895.56 
40-60 50,192.39 46,153.14 14,869.05 19,668.24 130,882.82 
60-100 29,783.41 46,540.87 23,750.01 43,541.67 143,615.96 
100+ 13,586.30 42,271.79 22,137.48 37,247.66 115,243.24 
Total 186,594.34 202,228.95 102,773.11 163,063.53 654,659.94 
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Table 14. cont. 
2+ Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 NA 4,385.44 5,909.24 21,133.51 31,428.18 
20-40 NA 20,461.10 16,082.97 60,003.60 96,547.67 
40-60 NA 30,077.20 15,839.70 40,902.15 86,819.04 
60-100 NA 67,984.33 32,776.24 72,495.87 173,256.44 
100+ NA 62,918.39 42,965.28 78,476.36 184,360.02 
Total NA 185,826.45 113,573.43 273,011.48 572,411.36 
Total Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 95,029.25 64,432.25 36,256.76 57,517.93 253,236.19 
20-40 84,327.93 109,505.91 39,149.56 102,989.58 335,972.98 
40-60 60,356.17 101,121.17 32,401.79 64,867.53 258,746.66 
60-100 36,159.31 134,929.29 60,126.53 122,052.41 353,267.54 
100+ 16,414.13 116,176.95 66,696.68 119,156.36 318,444.12 
Total 292,286.79 526,165.59 234,631.33 466,583.80 1,519,667.50 
 
 
Each cell within Table 13 and Table14 was then scaled so that overall total 
number of households within the respective matrix summed to the known total urban 
vehicle-owning households and rural vehicle-owning households of 6,199,869 
households and 1,714,454 households respectively.  These scaled values were then used 
as the original vehicle-owning household distributions for the raking process.  The urban 
vehicle-owning household results and rural vehicle-owning household results are shown 
in Table 15 and Table 16 respectively.  An example calculation of how the cell in Table 
 56 
15 corresponding to urban households with Household Income Level <$20,000, 
Household Size 1, and Number of Employees 0 is provided in Example 1.   
 
Example 1 







Total Old
Total New
Subtotal OldSubtotal New                                          
249,122=240,416.73  





92.218,983,5
869,194,6  
where 
New Subtotal=Cell in Table 15 which is the number of vehicle-owning 
urban households with Household Income Level <$20,000, Household 
Size 1, and Number of Employees 0   
=249,122 Households 
 
Old Subtotal= Cell in Table 13 which is the number of vehicle-owning 
urban households with Household Income Level <$20,000, Household 
Size 1, and Number of Employees 0   
 
=240,416.73 Households 
 
New Total=All vehicle-owning urban households, as shown in Table 15 
(Total of Total) 
 
=6,194,869 Households 
 
Old Total= All vehicle-owning urban households, as shown in Table 13 
(Total of Total) 
 
=5,983,218.92 Households 
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Table 15. Weighted Number of 2008 Vehicle-Owning Urban Households in Texas in 
2008 Prior to Iterating between Control Totals 
0 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 249,122 156,319 46,517 92,242 544,200 
20-40 144,525 128,343 24,612 42,024 339,504 
40-60 52,659 75,321 10,607 15,427 154,014 
60-100 24,582 62,005 7,276 11,073 104,937 
100+ 11,903 41,575 8,763 14,449 76,689 
Total 482,792 463,563 97,776 175,213 1,219,344 
1 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 161,215 123,581 93,617 203,690 582,102 
20-40 323,200 174,539 122,055 205,166 824,959 
40-60 231,988 169,048 79,241 92,843 573,120 
60-100 211,889 159,460 105,934 119,765 597,048 
100+ 91,216 148,885 73,981 119,922 434,004 
Total 1,019,507 775,513 474,828 741,385 3,011,234 
2+ Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 NA 29,568 44,048 115,006 188,622 
20-40 NA 71,976 68,671 153,989 294,636 
40-60 NA 121,986 84,007 131,678 337,670 
60-100 NA 181,398 167,742 199,777 548,917 
100+ NA 221,074 162,947 215,426 599,447 
Total NA 626,002 527,414 815,875 1,969,292 
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Table 15. cont. 
Total Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 410,337 309,468 184,182 410,937 1,314,924 
20-40 467,725 374,858 215,338 401,178 1,459,099 
40-60 284,647 366,355 173,854 239,948 1,064,804 
60-100 236,471 402,863 280,953 330,615 1,250,902 
100+ 103,119 411,534 245,691 349,796 1,110,140 
Total 1,502,300 1,865,078 1,100,018 1,732,474 6,199,869 
 
 
 
 
Table 16. Weighted Number of 2008 Vehicle-Owning Rural Households in Texas in 
2008 Prior to Iterating between Control Totals 
0 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 64,703 43,137 8,628 10,774 127,242 
20-40 32,687 49,180 4,230 8,139 94,236 
40-60 11,467 28,081 1,910 4,848 46,306 
60-100 7,193 23,019 4,062 6,786 41,060 
100+ 3,190 12,395 1,798 3,872 21,256 
Total 119,240 155,813 20,628 34,419 330,100 
1 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 42,507 24,606 25,609 30,274 122,997 
20-40 62,450 51,279 21,793 40,357 175,878 
40-60 56,626 52,069 16,775 22,189 147,659 
60-100 33,601 52,506 26,794 49,123 162,024 
100+ 15,328 47,690 24,975 42,022 130,015 
Total 210,511 228,150 115,946 183,965 738,572 
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Table 16. cont. 
2+ Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 NA 4,948 6,667 23,842 35,457 
20-40 NA 23,084 18,144 67,695 108,923 
40-60 NA 33,932 17,870 46,145 97,947 
60-100 NA 76,698 36,977 81,788 195,464 
100+ NA 70,983 48,472 88,535 207,991 
Total NA 209,645 128,131 308,005 645,781 
Total Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 107,210 72,691 40,904 64,890 285,695 
20-40 95,137 123,542 44,168 116,190 379,037 
40-60 68,092 114,083 36,555 73,182 291,912 
60-100 40,794 152,224 67,833 137,697 398,548 
100+ 18,518 131,068 75,246 134,429 359,261 
Total 329,751 593,608 264,706 526,389 1,714,454 
 
 
Each subsequent raking iteration that was performed resulted in values that were 
increasingly closer to satisfying both the household size and number of household 
employee control totals.  A total of 16 additional raking iterations (eight satisfying each 
control total specification type) were performed (similar to the process shown in 
Example 1); at which point the resulting matrix values were deemed to fit the control 
totals reasonably close.  The control totals for number of household employees were 
achieved exactly and the control totals for household size differed with a magnitude of 
no greater than 0.001 percent.  The resulting estimated weighted number of 2008 Texas 
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vehicle-owning households disaggregated by geographic location, household income 
level, household size, and number of household employees are shown in Table 17 and 
Table 18 for  urban vehicle-owning households and rural vehicle-owning households 
respectively.  The number of households remaining in each sub-cell after filtering was 
performed was then divided into these weighted totals to obtain the desired weights (see 
Table 19 for urban vehicle-owning household weights and Table 20 for rural vehicle-
owning household weights).  The weights were then applied to relevant NHTS variables, 
such as ANNMILES, to make the results more reflective of all gasoline-run vehicles 
owned by Texas in 2008.         
 
Table 17. Number of Vehicle-Owning Urban Households in Texas in 2008 
0 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 243,698 129,446 34,222 71,347 478,713 
20-40 141,379 106,850 18,243 32,745 299,217 
40-60 51,513 62,707 7,862 12,020 134,102 
60-100 24,047 51,621 5,393 8,628 89,689 
100+ 11,644 34,613 6,495 11,258 64,010 
Total 472,281 385,237 72,215 135,998 1,065,731 
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Table 17. cont. 
1 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 169,534 110,012 74,039 169,367 522,952 
20-40 339,878 156,209 97,257 171,856 765,200 
40-60 243,959 151,295 63,141 77,770 536,165 
60-100 222,823 142,714 84,411 100,321 550,269 
100+ 95,924 133,249 58,950 100,452 388,575 
Total 1,072,118 693,479 377,798 619,766 2,763,161 
2+ Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 NA 37,532 49,672 136,352 223,556 
20-40 NA 91,851 78,022 183,921 353,794 
40-60 NA 155,670 95,446 157,273 408,389 
60-100 NA 231,488 190,584 238,609 660,681 
100+ NA 282,120 185,137 257,300 724,557 
Total NA 798,661 598,861 973,455 2,370,977 
Total Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 413,232 276,990 157,933 377,066 1,225,221 
20-40 481,257 354,910 193,522 388,522 1,418,211 
40-60 295,472 369,672 166,449 247,063 1,078,656 
60-100 246,870 425,823 280,388 347,558 1,300,639 
100+ 107,568 449,982 250,582 369,010 1,177,142 
Total 1,544,399 1,877,377 1,048,874 1,729,219 6,199,869 
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Table 18. Number of Vehicle-Owning Rural Households in Texas in 2008 
0 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 70,872 47,138 9,985 10,525 138,520 
20-40 35,913 53,997 4,923 7,999 102,832 
40-60 12,598 30,832 2,223 4,765 50,418 
60-100 7,903 25,274 4,727 6,669 44,573 
100+ 3,505 13,609 2,093 3,806 23,013 
Total 130,791 170,850 23,951 33,764 359,356 
1 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 37,599 21,713 23,933 23,883 107,128 
20-40 55,407 45,465 20,481 32,030 153,383 
40-60 50,241 46,166 15,765 17,611 129,783 
60-100 29,812 46,554 25,181 38,986 140,533 
100+ 13,599 42,284 23,472 33,351 112,706 
Total 186,658 202,182 108,832 145,861 643,533 
2+ Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 NA 5,642 8,052 24,309 38,003 
20-40 NA 26,451 22,038 69,436 117,925 
40-60 NA 38,883 21,705 47,332 107,920 
60-100 NA 87,887 44,913 83,892 216,692 
100+ NA 81,338 58,875 90,812 231,025 
Total NA 240,201 155,583 315,781 711,565 
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Table 18. cont. 
Total Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 108,471 74,493 41,970 58,717 283,651 
20-40 91,320 125,913 47,442 109,465 374,140 
40-60 62,839 115,881 39,693 69,708 288,121 
60-100 37,715 159,715 74,821 129,547 401,798 
100+ 17,104 137,231 84,440 127,969 366,744 
Total 317,449 613,233 288,366 495,406 1,714,454 
 
 
 
 
Table 19. Weights for Vehicle-Owning Urban Households in Texas in 2008 
0 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 370.93 441.8 1,368.88 3,243.05 480.15 
20-40 238.01 205.09 380.06 1,423.70 252.29 
40-60 237.39 156.38 357.36 1,202.00 206.31 
60-100 178.13 147.07 299.61 1,078.50 175.17 
100+ 207.93 177.50 499.62 938.17 231.92 
Total 284.68 218.76 573.13 1,813.31 294.32 
1 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 1,130.23 846.25 1,322.13 2,731.73 1,313.95 
20-40 1,075.56 503.9 917.52 1,481.52 902.36 
40-60 906.91 457.08 650.94 733.68 667.70 
60-100 831.43 376.55 594.44 583.26 572.60 
100+ 841.44 326.59 398.31 446.45 434.16 
Total 959.82 445.11 688.16 910.08 707.60 
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Table 19. cont. 
2+ Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 NA 1,103.88 1,910.46 2,901.11 2,089.31 
20-40 NA 874.77 1,200.34 1,768.47 1,291.22 
40-60 NA 786.21 926.66 1,219.17 949.74 
60-100 NA 570.17 762.34 745.65 676.93 
100+ NA 483.91 557.64 620.00 544.78 
Total NA 602.31 771.73 959.07 760.66 
Total Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 512.06 606.11 1,476.01 2,878.37 815.73 
20-40 528.85 379.18 883.66 1,598.86 614.48 
40-60 607.97 397.50 749.77 1,008.42 572.84 
60-100 612.58 374.84 683.87 695.12 531.09 
100+ 632.75 379.41 508.28 565.97 470.67 
Total 556.34 404.17 722.86 976.41 582.53 
 
 
 
 
Table 20. Weights for Vehicle-Owning Rural Households in Texas in 2008 
0 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 281.24 359.83 624.06 2,105.00 342.87 
20-40 221.69 204.53 378.69 1,599.80 231.60 
40-60 203.19 176.18 741.00 1,191.25 206.63 
60-100 164.65 179.25 472.70 1,111.50 217.43 
100+ 219.06 189.01 348.83 1,903.00 239.72 
Total 242.21 218.20 498.98 1,534.73 257.97 
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Table 20. cont. 
1 Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 783.31 417.56 1,087.86 995.13 733.75 
20-40 644.27 341.84 640.03 781.22 525.28 
40-60 717.73 311.93 630.60 503.17 466.85 
60-100 608.41 290.96 503.62 448.11 406.16 
100+ 523.04 302.03 558.86 456.86 401.09 
Total 669.03 319.40 636.44 561.00 479.18 
2+ Emp Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 NA 434.00 1,610.40 2,430.90 1,357.25 
20-40 NA 480.93 881.52 2,239.87 1,062.39 
40-60 NA 441.85 700.16 676.17 571.01 
60-100 NA 441.64 615.25 603.54 527.23 
100+ NA 398.72 588.75 524.92 484.33 
Total NA 429.70 664.88 746.53 585.17 
Total Household Size 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
1 2 3 4+ Total 
<20 361.57 380.07 976.05 1,505.56 490.75 
20-40 368.23 278.57 677.74 1,421.62 441.72 
40-60 476.05 281.95 672.76 639.52 405.23 
60-100 388.81 319.43 562.56 558.39 417.67 
100+ 407.24 329.88 570.54 516.00 429.44 
Total 387.61 310.50 636.57 702.70 433.82 
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SUMMARY 
 The results obtained in this filtering and weighting process were used in Chapter 
IV to calculate the average household fee associated with either the current state gas tax 
or the VMT fees associated with each scenario.  By using the weights shown in Table 19 
and Table 20, the results were weighted to reflect revenues of all gasoline-run household 
vehicles in Texas.  Chapter IV includes an examination of the results and the equity 
impacts associated with each.  
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CHAPTER IV 
VMT FEE SCENARIO STRUCTURE, ANALYSIS, AND RESULTS 
 
Having merged, filtered, and weighted the data as described in Chapter III, the 
next step was to analyze and compare the results obtained from the current gas tax 
transportation funding system, as well as each of the four VMT fee scenarios.  The 
analysis of the four VMT fee scenarios took into consideration anticipated initial set-up 
costs, revenue lost due to those cheating the system (leakage), and the cost of operating 
the system.  Each scenario was analyzed twice; once using a static model and once using 
a dynamic model.  For the dynamic model it was necessary to obtain elasticity estimates.  
This chapter describes the process taken to obtain the revenue results for each scenario, 
with these issues taken into consideration.  The following section provides a discussion 
of the anticipated costs associated with switching from the current gas tax transportation 
funding system to a VMT fee system and how these anticipated costs were considered in 
the analysis. 
 
COSTS FOR A VMT FEE SYSTEM   
Transitioning from the current gas tax transportation funding system to a VMT 
fee system would have some initial set-up costs.  These costs would vary greatly 
depending on the depth, breadth, and speed of the new technology implementation.  As 
technology improves, set-up costs are likely to decrease.  As mentioned in the literature 
review, it has been suggested that a VMT fee system could be implemented gradually; 
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with those vehicles that were not equipped with the VMT fee technology continuing to 
be charged under the current state gas tax system.  However, for the purposes of this 
research, it was assumed that all gasoline-run vehicles being included in this analysis (a 
weighted total of 15,913,212 vehicles in Texas) would be provided a thin OBU 
immediately, at the assumed cost of $195 per unit (Wells, 2010).  Likewise, it was 
assumed that 16,000 service stations in Texas would be equipped with the equipment 
needed to process VMT fees.  This service station estimate was based on an estimate that 
there were16,500 service stations in Texas as of 2006 (Answers.com) and the fact that 
16,000 service stations belong to the Texas Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Store 
Association that “own, operate, or supply approximately 16,000 convenience stores, 
service stations, and other retail motor fuel outlets in Texas and the southwest United 
States (Texas Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Store Association, 2011).”  The 
estimated cost was $15,000 per station (Peters and Gordon, 2009).   
Given that the timeframe of this analysis was from 2009 to 2030, in an attempt to 
meet the needs described by the 2030 Texas Transportation Needs Commission by 2030, 
the implementation costs were spread-out over the 22 year time period under 
consideration (2009-2030).  Even after the initial implementation costs, there would be 
yearly operating costs associated with a VMT fee system.  The 2005 National Surface 
Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission (NSTIFC) report states that, “The 
aim should be for the total annual net cost of operation to be less than 10 percent of the 
total revenue collected within a few years of implementation and less than 5 percent in 
the longer term (National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission, 
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2009).”  This analysis assumed an operating cost of 10 percent of the gross generated 
revenue, rather than the 10 percent net operating cost suggested in the NSTIFC report, 
which seems conservative.    
In addition to implementation costs and operating costs, it is assumed that some 
individuals will try to cheat the system by either tampering with their OBU, 
misrepresenting their VMT, or altogether not reporting their VMT.  A wide-scale VMT 
fee system has not yet been implemented in the United States; therefore, it is difficult to 
estimate what percentage of drivers would cheat the system (the amount of „leakage‟).  
Smaller scale pilot tests—such as those performed in Oregon—are not a good source for 
estimating this leakage because individuals knowingly participating in such a closely 
monitored testing situation likely behave differently than the general public.  Given this 
lack of a dependable estimate, it was assumed that the leakage under a VMT fee system 
may be comparable to the percentage of HOV lane violators.  Therefore, the leakage was 
estimated to be 10 percent for this analysis—which is within the estimated range of 
HOV violators nationwide (Jones, 2009).  The cost estimates that were taken into 
consideration are shown in Table 21.  It was assumed that the life-span of the thin OBUs 
and the service station equipment spanned the duration of the 22-years being considered 
in the analysis (2009-2030). 
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Table 21. Estimated Expenses Associated with Switching from the Current State Gas 
Tax Transportation Funding System to a VMT Fee System 
Itemized Expense Number Estimated Cost Estimated Total Cost 
Thin OBU 15,913,212 OBUs $195 per OBU $3,103,076,340 
Service Station 
Equipment 
16,000 Stations $15,000 per Fuel Station $240,000,000 
Operating Cost NA 10 Percent of Gross Revenue Varies with Scenario 
Leakage NA 10 Percent of Gross Revenue Varies with Scenario 
 
 
 However, the installation costs of both the thin OBUs and the fuel station 
equipment was assumed to be paid for up front through bond proceeds in the amount of 
$3,343,076,340.  A coupon rate of 4.5 percent was assumed based on the recent state of 
Texas bond sales.  Thus, the annual cost of the system was calculated using Equations 
(4) and (5). 
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where 
InstallCost =$3,103,076,340+$240,000,000=$3,343,075,340 
C=Coupon= )Cost045.0( Install =$150,438,435.30 
y=Yield=0.045 
n=Life-span of investment (22 years in this analysis) 
1y)(1
yCost
CCost
n
Install
AnnualInstall


                                      (5)  
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where 
  AnnualInstallCost  =$242,525,632.92 
 The summation of all of the costs associated with installing a VMT fee create the 
need to raise funds in addition to those already collected from the state gas tax in order 
to achieve the same net revenue as the current state gas tax.  Scenario 1, as discussed 
later in this chapter, provides a summary of these additional revenue needs.  
 
ELASTICITIES 
Each scenario was examined assuming (a) no change in driver behavior due to 
the VMT fee (static) and (b) a change in VMT due to the VMT fee (dynamic).  In order 
to estimate the change in driver behavior due to the new VMT fee for the dynamic 
scenarios, it was necessary to determine reasonable elasticities.  Elasticity is defined as, 
“the percentage change in consumption of a good caused by a one-percent change in its 
price or other characteristics (such as traffic speed or road capacity) (Litman, 2011).”  
For example, in this analysis, an elasticity of -0.3 implies that a one percent increase in 
the price of gas/VMT fees would lead to a 0.3 percent decrease in VMT.   Elasticity in 
terms of VMT and the associated price of gas/VMT fees is shown mathematically in 
Equation (6).   
 
1
12
1
12
P
PP
VMT
VMTVMT
Fee VMTand/or  Gas ofCost  Totalin  Change %
inVMT Change %
Elasticity


           (6) 
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where 
              1VMT Original Vehicle Miles Traveled 
               2VMT New Vehicle Miles Traveled 
1P Original Price of Gas 
2P New Price of Gas (No State Tax) Plus VMT Fee 
 In cases where VMT fee scenarios have actually been implemented, it would be 
possible to directly calculate the elasticity associated with a given VMT fee scenario.  
However, for VMT fee research still in the theoretical stage, researchers often rely on 
the elasticities obtained from previous studies of a similar nature.  Gasoline price 
elasticities are assumed to be similar to VMT fee scenario elasticities.  Although a 
review of the literature on gasoline price elasticities yielded several elasticity results, it 
was difficult to find elasticities that were disaggregated by household income level and 
geographic location.  However, Wadud et al. provide this type of elasticity 
disaggregation (Wadud, Graham and Noland, 2009), as shown in Table 22 and Table 23.  
Wadud et al. recommend that the Seemingly Unrelated Regression Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares Autoregressive (SUR-FGLS with AR (1)) method results be used for the 
income quintiles and the Log-linear SUR-FGLS with AR (1) values with dummies for 
years 1985 and 1988 be used for the geographic location.  Thus, these are the values that 
were utilized in calculating the elasticities to be used in this analysis.    
 
 
Table 22. Price Elasticities by Household Income Quintile 
Income Quintile SUR-FGLS with AR (1) Elasticities 
1 (lowest income) -0.351 
2 -0.219 
3 -0.203 
4 -0.263 
5 (highest income) -0.293 
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Table 23. Price Elasticities by Geographic Location 
Geographic Location 
SUR-FGLS with AR (1) Log-linear with 
Dummies for 1985 and 1988 Elasticities 
Urban -0.301 
Rural -0.171 
 
 
 Obtaining elasticities that were disaggregated in this manner was critical for this 
research effort because, as explained by Lindsey, the response to a VMT fee should not 
be assumed to be uniform.  Thus, care should be taken in the analysis process to ensure 
that averages do not mask the overall response (Lindsey, 2010).  For Scenario 4, it was 
necessary to obtain price elasticities disaggregated simultaneously by both household 
income level and geographic location.  Using the separate results of the price elasticities 
obtained for household income level and geographic location (Table 22 and Table 23 
respectively), estimated elasticities taking both subcategories into account were 
calculated—resulting in ten unique elasticity groups.  These elasticities were calculated 
under two constraints.  First of all, the average of the urban and rural price elasticities for 
a given household income level needed to sum to the household income level aggregated 
total.  Additionally, the urban and rural price elasticity ratio had to be the same for each 
household income level as it was for the aggregated data.  The results are shown in Table 
24. 
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Table 24. Price Elasticities by Household Income Level and Geographic Location 
Household Income Level 
($1,000s) 
Urban Rural 
<20 -0.447 -0.254 
20-40 -0.280 -0.159 
40-60 -0.259 -0.147 
60-100 -0.335 -0.191 
100+ -0.373 -0.212 
Total (Weighted Average) -0.339 -0.192 
  
 
These elasticities were used in calculating the anticipated change in annual VMT 
for households within each subcategory of the three-way cross-classification matrices.  
The process was somewhat iterative because vehicles within each household were 
anticipated to be driven less each year with an increase in the transportation fee 
associated with their travel.  This meant that the initial revenue estimate based on initial 
VMT  would decrease—making it necessary to increase the transportation fee needed to 
secure the desired revenue total in spite of changes in travel patterns.  Interestingly, for 
each income level the elasticity magnitude is larger for urban households than for rural 
households.  This may be an indication of urban households having more travel options 
other than driving.  However, when considering either urban household elasticities or 
rural household elasticities separately, it is interesting to note that the largest elasticity 
magnitudes are seen in household income level quintiles 1 and 5—with household 
income level quintile 3 having the smallest elasticity magnitude.  This U-shaped patterns 
in is an indication that the poorest household income level quintile and the wealthiest 
household income level quintile will decrease their VMT more drastically as the price of 
gas increases.  For low income households, this may be because of switching to other 
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modes, while for high income households this may be an indication that they had more 
discretionary travel to begin with that could be eliminated as the price of gas increases 
(Wadud, Graham and Noland, 2009).  
Elasticities are based on the percent change in the total price of gas—not just the 
change in the state gas tax portion of the price.  As mentioned previously, it was 
assumed that only the state gas tax portion would be replaced with a VMT fee for each 
scenario.  An example of how the elasticities were applied in determining the new VMT 
anticipated after the first dynamic iteration of Scenario 1 is provided for a single urban 
household in household income level quintile 2 in Example 2.   
 
Example 2 
Determining the anticipated VMT after the First Dynamic Iteration of 
Scenario 1 for an Urban Household in Household Income Level Quintile 2: 
 
 Initial VMT (calculated under the static model): 10,000 miles 
 
 Household Weight:  1,076.56 
 
 Initial Weighted VMT (calculated under the static model): 
 
= (Initial VMT (calculated under the static model))  (Household Weight) 
 
= (10,000 miles)  (1,075.56) =10,755,632.91 miles 
 
 EIADMPG :  22.8 MPG 
 
 Texas State Gas Tax:  $0.20 per gallon 
 
 Price of Gas:  $2.92 per gallon 
 
 Initial Revenue from State Gas Tax:  
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model)) static under the d(calculate VMT  Weighted(Initial
EIADMPG)(
)Tax Gas State Texas(


 
 
$94,347.66miles) 91.632,755,10(
MPG) 8.22(
)20.0($
  
 
 Initial Revenue from the Rest of the Price of Gas:  
  
model)) static under the d(calculate VMT  WeightedInitial(
EIADMPG)(
Tax) Gas State TexasGas of (Price



 
 
.14$1,283,128miles) 91.632,755,10(
MPG) 8.22(
)20.0$92.2($


  
 
 Initial Revenue from All of Gas: 
 
= (Initial Revenue from State Gas Tax)+  
(Initial Revenue from the Rest of the Price of Gas) 
 
=$94,347.66+$1,283,128.14=$1,377,475.79 
 
 Flat VMT Fee:  
 
Tax) Gas Stateunder  VMT (Total
Tax) Gas State as RevenueNet  Sameh Amount wit (Collected
  
 
= 
miles 1,988176,389,02
,912$2,515,974 $0.014264 per mile 
 
 Scenario 1 VMT Fee Revenue:   
 
= (Initial Weighted VMT (calculated under the static model))   
(Flat VMT Fee) 
 
= (10,755,632.91 miles)  ($014264 per mile) =$153,416.02 
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 Scenario 1 VMT Fee Revenue Plus the Cost of Gas: 
 
= (Scenario 1 VMT Fee Revenue)+ 
(Initial Cost of the Rest of the Price of Gas) 
  
=$153,416.02+ .14$1,283,128 =$1,436,544.16 
 
 Percent Change in Overall Price of Gas When Switching from State 
Gas Tax System to Scenario 1:  
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



 
)79.475,377,1($
)79.475,377,1$16.544,436,1($ =4.29% 
 
 Elasticity for Urban Households in Household Income Level Quintile 
2:  -0.280 
 
 Percent Change in VMT (%):  
 
= (Percent Change in Overall Price of Gas When Switching from State 
Gas Tax System to Scenario 1)-(Elasticity for Urban Households in 
Household Income Level Quintile 2) 
 
= (4.29  -0.280) =-1.20 
 
 New VMT:   
 
= (Initial Weighted VMT (calculated under the static model))   






(100)
VMT)in  ChangePercent (  
 
= (10,755,632.91 miles)  




 
)100(
)20.1( =10,626,491.66 miles 
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This same procedure was performed for all weighted vehicles included in the 
analysis after filtering; with pertinent, aggregated results used in obtaining desired 
results.  Note that the elasticities used are based on household income level quintiles, 
which implies that the population is grouped to capture 20 percent of the population in 
each household income level.  The percentage of the 2008 Texas vehicle-owning 
households disaggregated by household income level is shown in Table 25.  Although 
not exactly 20 percent of the vehicle-owning households fall into each household income 
level, the actual household income level distribution was assumed to be close enough to 
true quintile distributions for the purposes of this analysis. The following section 
describes the structure of each VMT fee scenario.       
 
 
Table 25. Percentage of 2008 Texas Vehicle-Owning Households Disaggregated by 
Household Income Level 
Household Income Level ($1,000s) 
Percentage of Vehicle-Owning Population of 
Texas (%) 
<20 19.1 
20-40 22.7 
40-60 17.3 
60-100 21.5 
100+ 19.5 
Total 100.0 
 
 
SCENARIO STRUCTURE 
 This section provides a detailed description of how each of the scenarios were 
structured and highlights pivotal equations used to obtain the scenario results presented 
later in the chapter.  First, a description of the current Texas state gas tax is given; 
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followed by an explanation of how each scenario was designed and implemented both 
statically and dynamically.   
Current Texas State Gas Tax Structure 
 As a reference point for each scenario, the weighted average annual household 
revenue generated by the Texas state gas tax from vehicles included in this analysis was 
estimated for each household income level and geographic location group, as shown in 
Equation (7). 
 















p
1k
wl,i,
wl,i,
n
1j jw,l,i,
jw,l,i,
jw,l,i,
Weight
Weight$0.20
EIADMPG
ANNMILES
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                                                        (7) 
where 
  i=Household Income Level Quintile; 1 through 5 
  l=Location; Urban or Rural 
  w=Number Employed in Household; 0, 1 or 2+ 
j=Number of Vehicles in Group i, l, w, j 
  k=Number of Households in Group i, l, w 
 
For the purposes of determining the percent change in price needed to implement 
the dynamic model associated with the four VMT fees considered in this analysis, it was 
also necessary to determine annual average total amount spent on gas excluding the state 
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gas tax, as well as the annual average total amount spent on the price of gas including 
the state gas tax.  These two calculations are presented in Equation (8) and Equation (9) 
respectively.  
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where 
X=Price of a Gallon of Gas ($) Including Taxes 
 
Annual Avg. Household Total Cost of Gas                                                                     (9) 
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The cost of gasoline can vary by region, time of year, and gasoline grade.  
Wherever possible, the price of gas (X) was obtained for each vehicle from the NHTS 
variable GCOST.  For those vehicles that were originally without a GCOST listed, this 
value was estimated by calculating the average weekly price of all grades of retail 
gasoline for the state of Texas from March 26, 2007 to May 4, 2009—which 
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encompassed the dates during which the 2009 NHTS was administered (Energy 
Information Administration, 2010).  The average weekly Texas price of all grades and 
all formulations of retail gasoline during this time period was $2.84 per gallon. 
Scenario 1 Structure 
 The goal of Scenario 1 was to replace the state gas tax calculated for all weighted 
vehicles included in this analysis with a flat VMT fee that would generate roughly the 
same net revenue as the current state gas tax from these vehicles.  This amount was 
calculated to be $1,770,254,297 using the data that was weighted to reflect vehicle-
owning Texas households in the year 2008.  However, the total revenue that needed to 
be generated after considering the costs associated with VMT fees discussed previously 
in this chapter (i.e. installation costs, operating costs, leakage costs) was actually greater 
than under the current gas tax system.  The new target revenue from the flat VMT fee 
designed to generate a similar amount of revenue to that currently collected under the 
state gas tax was calculated using Equation (10).   
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where 
             1 ScenarioRevenueTarget  New =$2,515,974,912.40 
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Current State Gas Tax Annual Revenue=$1,770,254,297.00 
Annual Costs of Implementation of VMT Fees=$242,525,632.92 
Percent Increase in Operating Costs with Switch to VMT Fee=0.10 
Percent Leakage=0.10 
 
It follows that the flat VMT fee was calculated using Equation (11). 
 
Scenario 1 

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ANNMILES Weighted
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Fee VMTFlat Type Model                                               (11)              
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Model Type=Static or Dynamic 
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mileper  01442.0$
miles 35.959,070,496,174
40.912,974,515,2$
ANNMILES Weighted
RevenueTarget  New
1 Scenario Dynamic
1 Scenario




           
 
Scenario 2 Structure 
 Scenario 2 was similar to Scenario 1; the only difference being that the goal was 
to charge a higher flat VMT fee in order to generate additional net revenue needed to 
help maintain and improve Texas infrastructure and mobility in the amount of $14.3 
billion dollars annually.  This new target revenue was calculated as shown by Equation 
(12).   
 
Leakage)Percent Cost OperatingPercent (1
Annually) Revenue Desired Additional
Costson Installati Annual
 Revenue AnnualTax  Gas State(Current 
RevenueTarget  New



                                    (12) 
 
where 
  New Target Revenue=$20,390,974,912.40 
  Additional Desired Revenue Annually=$14.3 billion  
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Thus, the flat VMT fee associated with the static model of Scenario 2 was calculated as 
shown in Equation (13). 
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For all scenarios designed to generate the additional net revenue of $14.3 billion 
desired for addressing Texas‟s infrastructure and mobility needs, it was assumed that this 
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revenue increase would be strictly earmarked for transportation use.  The revenue 
amount currently dedicated to schools would not change. 
Scenario 3 Structure 
 Scenario 3 was a three-tier system geared towards encouraging the use of more 
fuel efficient vehicles.  Initially, vehicles were placed into one of three categories based 
upon their fuel economy in the same manner outlined by Zhang and McMullen in their 
paper entitled, Green Vehicle Mileage Fees:  Concept, Evaluation Methodology, 
Revenue Impact, and User Responses (Zhang and McMullen, 2010).  Categories were 
delineated using the following system (Zhang and McMullen, 2010): 
 MPGMedian Fuel Economy:  $0.020 per mile fee 
 Median Fuel Economy<MPGMean Fuel Economy:  $0.015 per mile fee 
 MPGMean Fuel Economy:  $0.010 per mile fee 
Thus, it was necessary to determine both the median and mean fuel economy for the data 
that was weighted to reflect vehicle-owning Texas households in the year 2008 (see 
Table 26). 
 
 
Table 26. Weighted Average and Median Vehicle Fuel Economy 
Average Vehicle Fuel Economy (MPG) 21.02 
Median Vehicle Fuel Economy (MPG) 19.60 
 
 
After the initial scenario was run and the VMT fee revenue generated was 
calculated, Scenario 3 was then scaled to better meet the need for additional revenue; 
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keeping the original fee ratio.  The same new target revenue as that calculated in 
Equation (12) for Scenario 2 was used for Scenario 3.  The resulting fees under the static 
model and the dynamic model are shown below. 
Static Model 
 MPGMedian Fuel Economy:  $0.1541 per mile fee 
 Median Fuel Economy<MPGMean Fuel Economy:  $0.1156 per mile fee 
 
 MPGMean Fuel Economy:  $0.07706 per mile fee 
Dynamic Model 
 MPGMedian Fuel Economy:  $0.1974 per mile fee 
 Median Fuel Economy<MPGMean Fuel Economy:  $0.1480 per mile fee 
 
 MPGMean Fuel Economy:  $0.09868 per mile fee 
 
Scenario 4 Structure 
 Under Scenario 4, a different VMT fee was assessed to miles traveled on urban 
roadways versus rural roadways.  The goal was to raise the additional revenue needed to 
meet the infrastructure and mobility needs established by the 2030 Committee, with 
travel fees disaggregated to allow urban roadway travel to pay for urban needs, rural 
roadway travel to pay for rural needs, and to have the shared costs be paid for by funds 
collected on all roadway types.  The Texas infrastructure and mobility needs are 
disaggregated by need type in Table 27 (Texas 2030 Committee, 2009). 
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Table 27. Disaggregated Texas Infrastructure Needs and Associated Needed Revenue 
Cost Type Description Annual Amount ($) 
Urban Cost Urban Mobility 7.8 Billion 
Rural Cost Rural Mobility and Safety 0.9 Billion 
Shared Cost Pavement Maintenance 4.0 Billion 
Shared Cost Bridge Maintenance 1.6 Billion 
 
 
  It was challenging to determine the average annual fee for urban households and 
rural households because it was unknown what percentage of travel by urban households 
was on urban roadways or what percentage of travel by rural households was on rural 
roadways.  Logically, it was assumed that urban households travel more on urban 
roadways and rural households travel more on rural roadways.  For the purposes of this 
research two logical combinations were assumed. 
 80/20:  80 percent of urban household travel was assumed to be on urban 
roadways and 20 percent of urban household travel was assumed to be on rural 
roadways.  Conversely, 20 percent of rural household travel was assumed to be 
on urban roadways and 80 percent of rural household travel was assumed to be 
on rural roadways.   
 70/30:  70 percent of urban household travel was assumed to be on urban 
roadways and 30 percent of urban households travel was assumed to be on rural 
roadways.  Conversely, 30 percent of rural household travel was assumed to be 
on urban roadways and 70 percent of rural household travel was assumed to be 
on rural roadways.   
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These assumptions seem reasonable based on rough estimates obtained by Mark 
Ojah of TTI (Ojah, pers. comm.).  Using second-by-second GPS vehicle tracking data 
for 159 vehicles in Waco, Texas, Ojah estimated the percentage of urban household 
travel on urban roadways to be 77.75 percent and the percentage of rural household 
travel on rural roadways to be 58.68 percent in terms of distance.  It is assumed that the 
rural household percentage of travel on rural roadways may be even higher when taking 
travel by rural households in more remote areas than the rural Waco area into 
consideration.  Additional differences between these estimates and the actual urban 
household versus rural household road type travel breakdown may stem from the fact 
that the delineation of urban versus rural used in Ojah‟s analysis was based on 
Transportation Analysis Zone (TAZ) (households and travel outside a TAZ were 
considered rural), which does not directly correspond to the census definition used in 
this analysis (Ojah, pers. comm.).  However, these rough estimate values are at least 
similar to the estimates of 80/20 and 70/30 used in this analysis.  Further research into a 
more exact estimate may be useful in future research.  The resulting urban roadway fee 
and rural roadway fee for the static model and dynamic model associated with the 80/20 
assumption and the 70/30 assumption are shown below. 
Static Model under 80/20 Assumption 
 Urban Roadway Fee:  $0.1325 per mile fee 
 Rural Roadway Fee:  $0.08621 per mile fee 
Static Model under 70/30 Assumption 
 Urban Roadway Fee:  $0.1415 per mile fee 
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 Rural Roadway Fee:  $0.07827 per mile fee 
Dynamic Model under 80/20 Assumption 
 Urban Roadway Fee:  $0.1799 per mile fee 
 Rural Roadway Fee:  $0.1072 per mile fee 
Dynamic Model under 70/30 Assumption 
 Urban Roadway Fee:  $0.1899 per mile fee 
 Rural Roadway Fee:  $0.09956 per mile fee 
 
POTENTIAL VMT FEE GOALS 
 Establishing desired goals for VMT fee scenarios is an important component that 
policy-makers should consider prior to evaluating how a proposed scenario would affect 
their constituents.  In the evaluation of equity, VMT fee scenario goals could take many 
forms.  The following list gives a brief overview of a few possibilities.  Policy-makers 
may use this list as a starting-point as they brainstorm their own goal ideas. 
 Establish Horizontal Equity 
 Establish Vertical Equity 
 Familiarize travelers with the VMT fee concept 
 Implement a VMT fee collection and monitoring system that is easy to 
understand  
 
 Generate additional revenue to address mobility and infrastructure needs 
 Encourage the use of more fuel efficient vehicles 
 More closely link travel to use of infrastructure 
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 Make the transition from the current state gas tax system to a VMT fee timely 
and affordable 
 
An evaluation of how each of these potential goals were reached (or not reached) 
within the framework of this analysis is provided in Chapter V.  The following section 
includes the analysis results and provides results discussion. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 As mentioned previously, each VMT fee scenario considered in this analysis 
assumed that the VMT fee would only replace the state gas tax of the included vehicles; 
with both the federal gas tax and the rest of the price of gas unchanged.  The state gas 
tax is only a fraction (approximately 7 percent) of the total cost of gasoline.  In order to 
more easily see and analyze changes brought about under each scenario, the results only 
reflect the revenue associated with either the current state gas tax or the VMT fees 
suggested in each scenario.  However, it is important to note that when calculating the 
percent change in price stemming from a shift in VMT anticipated in the dynamic 
models based on elasticities, the entire price of gasoline and/or VMT fees was 
considered (as shown previously in Example 2).  This was because the whole price of 
gas was associated with the gas price elasticities obtained for the analysis. 
Current Texas State Gas Tax 
 The average revenue generated per household from the current state gas tax is 
provided in Table 28.  Note that for each income level, the household average is higher 
for rural households than for urban households.  Possible explanations for this finding 
vary.  First of all, it may be that rural households drive more on average than their urban 
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household counterparts.  Another possible explanation may be that the average fuel 
economy of rural household vehicles is lower than urban household vehicles—causing 
them to buy more gas to travel the same distance as urban households with more fuel 
efficient vehicles.  Still another reason may be that rural households own more vehicles 
than urban households falling within the same household income level.    
 
 
Table 28. Current State Gas Tax:  Weighted Average Annual State Gas Tax Paid by 
Each Vehicle-Owning Household 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-
Owning 
Households 
($ per year) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Urban 
Households 
($ per year) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Rural 
Households 
($ per year) 
Percent More 
that Rural 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 126.51 122.43 144.17 17.8 
20-40 179.34 162.82 241.95 48.6 
40-60 218.32 202.18 278.74 37.9 
60-100 279.65 257.15 352.45 37.1 
100+ 313.14 289.60 388.70 34.2 
Total 223.68 205.55 289.25 40.7 
 
 
 Since this research is focused on the equity of a VMT fee scenario it is critical to 
both calculate and understand current expenditures on the state gas tax.  Therefore, the 
potential reasons for the differences in state gas tax paid by urban and rural households 
(evident in Table 28) were investigated.  The weighted average fuel economy for both 
rural households and urban households used in this analysis were compared (see Table 
29).  It can be seen that for each household income level, the weighted average vehicle 
fuel economy is lower for rural households than for urban households—contributing to 
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the higher weighted average annual revenue collected under the current state gas tax for 
rural households when compared to their urban household counterparts.  Similarly, as 
seen in Table 29, the weighted average fuel economy increases as household income 
level increases.   
 
 
Table 29. Weighted Average Vehicle Fuel Economy 
Household Income 
Level ($1,000s) 
All Vehicles (MPG) 
Urban Household 
Vehicles (MPG) 
Rural Household 
Vehicles (MPG) 
Percent Higher 
Average Vehicle 
Fuel Economy of 
Urban Households 
than Rural 
Households (%) 
<20 19.76 19.83 19.48 1.8 
20-40 20.58 20.78 19.98 4.0 
40-60 21.25 21.43 20.67 3.7 
60-100 21.43 21.44 21.41 0.1 
100+ 21.55 21.60 21.42 0.8 
Total 21.02 21.10 20.77 1.6 
 
  
The weighted average vehicle year for all vehicle-owning households is shown in 
Table 30; with a distinction made between rural households and urban households.  As 
household income level increases, the weighted average vehicle year also increases.  
This may point to the households‟ ability to pay for newer vehicles and indicates that 
higher income households tend to own newer vehicles on average.  The difference in 
rural households versus urban households in the same household income level is not as 
drastic.  In fact, for household income levels 3 and 4, rural households actually have 
slightly newer vehicles on average than their urban household counterparts.  Therefore, 
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it does not appear that vehicle year differences in rural household vehicles and urban 
household vehicles contribute much to the higher weighted average state gas tax paid. 
 
 
 
Table 30. Weighted Average Vehicle Year 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-
Owning 
Households 
Urban Vehicle-
Owning 
Households 
Rural Vehicle-
Owning 
Households 
Percent Higher 
Weighted 
Average Vehicle 
Year of Rural 
Households than 
Urban 
Households (%) 
<20 1997.57 1997.60 1997.42 0.18 
20-40 1999.51 1999.73 1998.85 0.88 
40-60 2000.52 2000.50 2000.61 -0.11 
60-100 2001.47 2001.42 2001.62 -0.20 
100+ 2002.25 2002.27 2002.17 0.10 
Total 2000.54 2000.54 2000.53 0.01 
 
  
Next, an investigation into the differences in the weighted average annual VMT 
between urban households and rural households was performed.  The weighted average 
annual VMT per household is shown in Table 31, while the weighted average annual 
VMT per vehicle is provided in Table 32.  The average annual revenue per vehicle 
disaggregated by household income level and household geographic location is shown in 
Table 33.  Interestingly, it can be seen that for all household income levels, the weighted 
average annual VMT per vehicle-owning household is considerably higher for rural 
households than for urban households.  This finding was to be expected, given the need 
for rural households to travel farther to have access to goods, services, school, and work 
that are more prevalent in urban areas.  On a per vehicle basis, rural vehicle-owning 
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households still have higher weighted average annual VMT values than urban vehicle-
owning households in the same household income level.  The fact that the difference 
between rural households and urban households on a per household basis is higher 
percentage-wise than on a per vehicle basis suggests that on average, rural vehicle-
owning households own more vehicles than urban vehicle-owning households with the 
same household income level. 
 
 
Table 31. Current Gas Tax System:  Weighted Average Annual VMT per Vehicle-
Owning Household 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-
Owning 
Households 
(miles) 
Urban Vehicle-
Owning 
Households 
(miles) 
Rural Vehicle-
Owning 
Households 
(miles) 
Percent More 
Miles Driven by 
Rural Vehicle-
Owning 
Households than 
Urban Vehicle-
Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 12,480 12,127 14,005 15.5 
20-40 17,907 16,530 23,124 39.9 
40-60 21,809 20,330 27,347 34.5 
60-100 27,835 25,798 34,429 33.5 
100+ 31,263 29,100 38,207 31.3 
Total 22,287 20,652 28,201 36.6 
 
 
Table 32. Weighted Average Annual VMT per Vehicle 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicles 
(miles) 
Urban 
Household 
Vehicles (miles) 
Rural Household 
Vehicles (miles) 
Percent More 
that Rural 
Vehicles are 
Driven than 
Urban Vehicles 
(%) 
<20 8,305 8,184 8,790 7.4 
20-40 9,957 9,681 10,790 11.5 
40-60 10,820 10,377 12,282 18.4 
60-100 12,298 11,771 13,795 17.2 
100+ 12,654 12,047 14,431 19.8 
Total 11,084 10,631 12,496 17.5 
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Table 33. Average State Gas Tax Paid per Vehicle 
Household Income 
Level ($1,000s) 
All Vehicles ($) 
Urban Household 
Vehicles ($) 
Rural Household 
Vehicles ($) 
Percent More that 
Rural Vehicle-
Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households per 
Vehicle (%) 
<20 84.19 82.62 90.49 9.5 
20-40 99.72 95.35 112.90 18.4 
40-60 108.32 103.20 125.19 21.3 
60-100 123.55 117.34 141.22 20.4 
100+ 126.75 119.89 146.82 22.5 
Total 111.24 105.81 128.17 21.1 
  
 
 
A summary of the findings from the weighted annual average state gas tax is provided in 
Table 34 on a per vehicle basis and in Table 35 on a per household basis.   
 
 
Table 34. Summary of Weighted Annual Average State Gas Tax Findings on a per 
Vehicle Basis 
Household Income 
Level ($1,000s) 
Percentage More 
that Rural Vehicle-
Owning 
Households Pay 
per Vehicle than 
Urban Vehicle-
Owning 
Households Pay 
per Vehicle 
(Weighted 
Average) (%) 
Percentage More 
that Rural 
Households Drive 
per Vehicle than 
Urban Households 
Drive per Vehicle 
(%) 
Percentage Worse 
Gas Mileage that 
Rural Household 
Vehicles Have 
Compared to their 
Urban Household 
Counterparts (%) 
Percentage More 
that Rural Vehicle-
Owning 
Households Pay 
per Vehicle than 
Urban Vehicle-
Owning 
Households Pay 
per Vehicle 
(Unweighted 
Average) (%) 
<20 9.5 7.4 1.8 9.3 
20-40 18.4 11.5 4.0 16.0 
40-60 21.3 18.4 3.7 22.8 
60-100 20.4 17.2 0.1 17.4 
100+ 22.5 19.8 0.8 20.8 
Total 21.1 17.5 1.6 19.4 
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 An example calculation used to obtain the last column in Table 34 (Percent More 
Gasoline that Rural Households Spend per Vehicle Compared to their Urban Household 
Counterparts (Unweighted Average) (%)) is shown below in Example 3: 
 
Example 3 
 Per Vehicle:  Household Income Level <$20,000  
 Rural households pay 9.5 % more per vehicle 
 Rural households drive 7.4 % more per vehicle 
 Rural household vehicles have a 1.8 % worse average gas mileage 
Urban Households  Rural Households 
        100 miles                              107.4 miles 
     19.83 MPG        19.48 MPG 
 
Required Gallons of Gasoline: 
 
Urban Households= gallons 04286.5
MPG 19.83
miles 100
  
 
Rural Households= gallons 51335.5
MPG 19.48
miles 4.107
  
 
Percent More Gasoline that Rural Households Spend per Vehicle Compared 
to their Urban Household Counterparts (%): 
 
093.1
gallons 5.04
gallons 51.5
  
 
(1.093-1) 100=9.3% 
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Table 35. Summary of Weighted Annual Average State Gas Tax Findings on a per 
Household Basis 
Household Income 
Level ($1,000s) 
Percentage More 
that Rural 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
per Household 
(Weighted 
Average) (%) 
Percentage More 
that Rural 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Drive 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Drive 
per Household (%) 
Percentage Worse 
Gas Mileage that 
Rural Vehicle-
Owning 
Households Have 
Compared to their 
Urban Household 
Counterparts (%) 
Percentage More 
that Rural Vehicle-
Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
per Household 
(Unweighted 
Average) (%) 
<20 17.8 15.5 1.8 17.6 
20-40 48.6 39.9 4.0 45.5 
40-60 37.9 34.5 3.7 39.4 
60-100 37.1 33.5 0.1 33.7 
100+ 34.2 31.3 0.8 32.4 
Total 40.7 36.6 1.6 38.8 
 
 
An example calculation used to obtain the last column in Table 35 (Percent More 
Gasoline that Rural Households Spend per Household Compared to their Urban 
Household Counterparts (Unweighted Average)) (%)) is shown below in Example 4: 
 
Example 4 
Per Household:  Household Income Level <$20,000  
 Rural Households pay 17.8 % more per household 
 Rural Households drive 15.5 % more per household 
 Rural Household have a 1.8 % worse average gas mileage 
Urban Households  Rural Households 
        100 miles                     115.5 miles 
     19.83 MPG                     19.48 MPG 
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Required Gallons of Gasoline: 
 
Urban Households= gallons 04.5
MPG 19.83
miles 100
  
 
Rural Households= gallons 93.5
MPG 19.48
miles 5.115
  
 
Percent More Gasoline that Rural Households Spend per Vehicle Compared 
to their Urban Household Counterparts (%): 
 
176.1
gallons 5.04
gallons 93.5
  
 
  (1.176-1) 100=17.6% 
 
Note that columns one and four of Table 34 and columns one and four of Table 
35 are similar, yet slightly different.  Differences stem from the fact that the fourth 
column does not take into consideration which vehicles (and their corresponding vehicle 
gas mileage) are driven what proportion of the ANNMILES.  As a simplified, theoretical 
example, consider Example 5; which helps to illustrate the reason for these differences.   
 
Example 5 
                             Urban Households 
                    ANNMILES      Vehicle Gas Mileage        
Vehicle 1:     100 Miles                    25 MPG 
Vehicle 2:       50 Miles                    30 MPG 
Vehicle 3:       25 Miles                    15 MPG 
                                                      23.33 MPG (unweighted average) 
                                                           25 MPG (weighted average) 
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                               Rural Households 
                    ANNMILES      Vehicle Gas Mileage        
Vehicle 1:    107.4 Miles                  20 MPG 
Vehicle 2:      53.7 Miles                  25 MPG 
Vehicle 3:    26.85 Mile               23.76 MPG 
                                                      22.92 MPG (unweighted average) 
                                                      21.97 MPG (weighted average) 
 
Summary 
 
 Rural households drive 7.4 % more per vehicle 
 
 Rural household vehicles have a 1.8 % worse average gas mileage (unweighted  
by ANNMILES) 
 
 Rural household vehicle have a 13.8 % worse average gas mileage (weighted by 
ANNMILES) 
 
Although the GCOST varied slightly for different vehicles included in the survey, the 
GCOST value ranges were small, and thus were assumed to have little effect on 
differences in the unweighted average column and weighted average column. 
To summarize Table 34, it appears that on average, rural households pay more in 
gasoline per vehicle, drive their vehicles more miles, and have slightly worse gas 
mileage than urban households.  The fact that the overall percentage more that rural 
households pay per vehicle is higher for the weighted average than the unweighted 
average is an indication that rural households tend to drive their less fuel efficient 
vehicles more than their more fuel efficient vehicles.  Differences between urban 
households and rural households are magnified in Table 35 when compared to Table 34, 
which supports the notion that rural households own more vehicles, on average, than 
urban households.   
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Static Scenario 1 
The goal of Scenario 1 was to collect a similar amount of revenue as is currently 
collected through the state gas tax by charging a flat VMT fee in place of the current 
state gas tax.  However, as was mentioned previously, costs associated with changing to 
a VMT fee system were considered in adjusting the projected revenue needed to 
generate a similar amount to that collected under the current state gas tax after these 
additional costs were accounted for.  Inherently, switching to a flat VMT fee would 
cause the amount charged in VMT fees relative to the amount charged through the state 
gas tax to decrease for vehicles with low fuel economies and to increase for highly fuel 
efficient vehicles.  The new expected weighted average annual household expenditure on 
gasoline and the cost incurred from the flat VMT fee implemented as part of Scenario 1, 
disaggregated in terms of household income level and household geographic location is 
shown in Table 36.  Not surprisingly, rural households pay more per household than 
their urban household counterparts in every household income level range as was seen 
under the current state gas tax.  Likewise, households with higher income levels pay 
increasingly more per household on average.     
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Table 36. Static Scenario 1:  Weighted Average Annual VMT Fee Revenue from 
Vehicle-Owning Households 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-
Owning 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Urban 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Rural 
Households ($) 
Percent More 
that Rural 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 178.02 172.98 199.76 15.5 
20-40 255.42 235.79 329.84 39.9 
40-60 311.08 289.98 390.07 34.5 
60-100 397.03 367.98 491.08 33.5 
100+ 445.94 415.08 544.98 31.3 
Total 317.90 294.58 402.25 36.6 
 
 
 
 
A side-by-side comparison of the current state gas tax results to the Static 
Scenario 1 results is shown in Table 37.  Though all household classifications would pay 
more on average than under the current state gas tax due to installation costs, operation 
costs, and leakage, the percent increase would be lower for rural household when 
compared to their urban household counterparts in every household income level. 
 
 
Table 37. Comparison of per Household Weighted Average Annual State Gas Tax Paid 
versus from VMT Fee Paid 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Urban 
Vehicle-
Owning  
Households 
under 
Current Gas 
Tax  ($) 
All Urban 
Vehicle-
Owning  
Households 
under VMT 
Fee Static 
Scenario 1  
($) 
Percent 
Change in 
Weighted 
Average Cost 
per Urban 
Household 
(%) 
All Rural 
Vehicle-
Owning  
Households 
under 
Current Gas 
Tax  ($) 
All Rural 
Vehicle-
Owning  
Households 
under VMT 
Fee Static 
Scenario 1  
($) 
Percent 
Change in 
Weighted 
Average Cost 
per Rural 
Household 
(%) 
<20 122.43 172.98 41.29 144.17 199.76 38.6 
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Table 37. cont. 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Urban 
Vehicle-
Owning  
Households 
under 
Current Gas 
Tax  ($) 
All Urban 
Vehicle-
Owning  
Households 
under VMT 
Fee Static 
Scenario 1  
($) 
Percent 
Change in 
Weighted 
Average Cost 
per Urban 
Household 
(%) 
All Rural 
Vehicle-
Owning  
Households 
under 
Current Gas 
Tax  ($) 
All Rural 
Vehicle-
Owning  
Households 
under VMT 
Fee Static 
Scenario 1  
($) 
Percent 
Change in 
Weighted 
Average Cost 
per Rural 
Household 
(%) 
20-40 162.82 235.79 44.82 241.95 329.84 36.3 
40-60 202.18 289.98 43.43 278.74 390.07 39.9 
60-100 257.15 367.98 43.10 352.45 491.08 39.3 
100+ 289.60 415.08 43.33 388.70 544.98 40.2 
Total 205.55 294.58 43.31 289.25 402.25 39.1 
 
 
The percent increase experienced by each household income level amongst urban 
households of all household income levels ranges from 41.29 percent to 44.82 percent.  
The percent increase experienced by each rural household income level is similar; 
ranging from 36.3 percent to 40.2 percent.  On average, urban households experience a 
higher percent increase.  For urban households the second lowest income level 
experiences the highest percent increase when changing to the flat VMT fee.  While for 
rural households, the lower household income levels generally experience a lower 
percent increase than the higher income rural households.  For urban households the 
smallest percent increase is experienced by household income level quintile 1 and for 
rural households the smallest percent increase is experienced by household income level 
quintile 2.  The reason that a sequentially increasing percentage is not seen for either 
urban households or rural households based on household income level is that even 
though the weighted average fuel economy increases as household income level 
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increases the average vehicle fuel economy of a household income level does not reflect 
how many miles a vehicle was driven.  This helps to explain why the highest percent 
increase for urban households is experienced by household income level quintile 2, even 
though the average fuel economy of vehicles within this subcategory is not the highest of 
all urban household income level quintiles.  Rather, this result is an indication that urban 
households within household income level quintile 2 drove their more fuel efficient 
vehicles more extensively than their less fuel efficient vehicles.       
Dynamic Scenario 1 
 Implementing a dynamic model was an iterative process.  Based on the definition 
of elasticity previously given, it was anticipated that as the total transportation fee 
amount increases for a given vehicle, the vehicle would be driven less.  As the total 
VMT fluctuated, the flat VMT fee was adjusted so that the amount of revenue collected 
still met the desired total VMT fee net revenue.  The iterative approach was performed 
until the largest percent change in VMT was calculated to have a magnitude of less than 
0.01 percent.  A summary of the largest magnitude percent change in total VMT 
calculated for each of Scenario 1‟s iterations, along with the flat VMT fee to be assessed 
is provided in Table 38.  A microscopic household example illustrating the calculations 
incorporated in the first iteration of the dynamic model of Scenario 1 was provided 
previously in Example 2.  Aggregated results were obtained by summing the weighted 
VMT changes and their associated revenues for every vehicle included in the analysis.  
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Table 38. Summary of Dynamic Scenario 1 Iteration Results 
Iteration Number Largest Magnitude Percent Change in VMT (%) Flat Fee Assessed ($) 
1 -9.45 0.014264 
2 0.88 0.014420 
3 -0.084 0.014418 
4 0.0081 0.014419 
 
  
The weighted average annual cost per household associated with the flat VMT 
fee anticipated after accounting for changes in driver behavior caused by fluctuations in 
the total cost of gas is shown in Table 39.  Note that when compared to the static model 
results for Scenario 1, the dynamic model results indicate an increase in the percent 
difference in the weighted average annual VMT fee assessed to rural households and 
urban households.  This increase is a reflection of the fact that for a given household 
income level, rural households have a lower elasticity magnitude than their urban 
household counterparts—indicating that rural households tend to have less of a 
propensity to change their VMT when the cost associated with gas and/or VMT fee 
increases.  A side-by-side comparison of the percent difference between rural vehicle-
owning households and urban vehicle-owning households associated with both the static 
model and dynamic model of Scenario 1 is provided in Table 40.   
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Table 39. Dynamic Scenario 1:  Weighted Average Annual VMT Fee Revenue from 
Vehicle-Owning Households 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-
Owning 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Urban 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Rural 
Households ($) 
Percent More 
that Rural 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 177.43 172.17 200.18 16.3 
20-40 255.82 235.81 331.69 40.7 
40-60 311.79 290.30 392.23 35.1 
60-100 397.03 367.40 492.98 34.2 
100+ 445.41 413.85 546.69 32.1 
Total 317.90 294.12 403.90 37.3 
 
 
 
 
Table 40. Comparison of Percent Difference between Rural Vehicle-Owning 
Households and Urban Vehicle-Owning Households for Static Model and Dynamic 
Model of Scenario 1 
Household Income Level 
($1,000s) 
Static Scenario 1 Percent 
More that Rural Vehicle-
Owning Households Pay than 
Urban Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
Dynamic Scenario 1 Percent 
More that Rural Vehicle-
Owning Households Pay than 
Urban Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 15.5 16.3 
20-40 39.9 40.7 
40-60 34.5 35.1 
60-100 33.5 34.2 
100+ 31.3 32.1 
Total 36.6 37.3 
 
 
For both the static and dynamic scenarios, the lowest revenue discrepancy 
between urban households and rural households is experienced by the lowest household 
income level quintile.  This may be an indication that although rural households travel 
more than urban households at all household income levels, the combination of vehicle 
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fuel economy, household VMT, and proportion of vehicle type usage cause this 
discrepancy to peak somewhere within the household income level 2 quintile and then 
gradually taper off as household income level increases.  Interestingly, the overall 
percent increase seen in Table 40 when comparing the static model and the dynamic 
model of Scenario 1 is between 0.6 percent and 0.8 percent for all household income 
level.  Thus, although the relative impact of this increase differs with household income 
level, there is a large amount of uniformity in absolute percentage terms.   
Static Scenario 2 
Given the large sum of additional revenue that was desired under Scenarios 2-4, 
it is difficult to directly compare the results from these scenarios to results obtained with 
either the current state gas tax or the flat VMT fee designed for in Scenario 1.  However, 
in spite of the drastic difference in the weighted average annual cost per household 
corresponding to either the state gas tax or the proposed VMT fee scenario, it is still 
possible to compare the results between Scenarios 2-4 with the results of the current 
state gas tax and Scenario 1 in relative terms.  In other words, it is still possible to assess 
how different household income levels and different geographic location combinations 
are affected relative to other household income level and geographic location 
combinations for a given scenario.    
The weighted average annual cost per household associated with the static model 
of Scenario 2‟s flat VMT fee is provided in Table 41.  Note that the percent difference in 
weighted average annual VMT fee revenue for rural vehicle-owning household versus 
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urban vehicle-owning households is the same as the values obtained in the static model 
of Scenario 1. 
   
Table 41. Static Scenario 2:  Weighted Average Annual VMT Fee Revenue from 
Vehicle-Owning Households 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-
Owning 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Urban 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Rural 
Households ($) 
Percent More 
that Rural 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 1,442.75 1,401.95 1,619.00 15.5 
20-40 2,070.07 1,910.96 2,673.19 39.9 
40-60 2,521.17 2,350.16 3,161.37 34.5 
60-100 3,217.79 2,982.31 3,980.04 33.5 
100+ 3,614.13 3,364.05 4,416.81 31.3 
Total 2,576.46 2,387.43 3,260.07 36.6 
 
 
Dynamic Scenario 2 
 As described for Scenario 1, an iterative process was performed when 
implementing the dynamic model.  However, it took seven iterations to reach a point 
where the percent change in VMT for all vehicles was 0.01 or less.  The larger number 
of iterations needed for the implementation of Scenario 2 likely stemmed from the fact 
that the percent change in the total price of gasoline (including either the current state 
gas tax or the flat VMT fee) was much greater under Scenario 2 than Scenario 1 because 
of the additional revenue for which the scenario was designed.  The largest magnitude 
percent change in total VMT calculated for each of Scenario 2‟s iterations, along with 
the associated flat VMT fee is listed in Table 42. 
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Table 42. Summary of Dynamic Scenario 2 Iteration Results 
Iteration Number 
Largest Magnitude Percent 
Change in VMT (%) 
Flat Fee Assessed ($) 
1 -98.48 0.115602 
2 31.08 0.150590 
3 -3.31 0.150256 
4 0.61 0.150335 
5 -0.12 0.150324 
6 0.02 0.150326 
7 -.005 0.150325 
  
  
The weighted average annual cost per household associated with the dynamic 
model of Scenario 2‟s flat VMT fee is shown in Table 43, while a side-by-side 
comparison of the static versus dynamic Scenario 2 results and the dynamic results of 
Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 are provided in Table 44 and Table 45 respectively.   
 
 
Table 43. Dynamic Scenario 2:  Weighted Average Annual VMT Fees Paid by Vehicle-
Owning Households 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-
Owning 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Urban 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Rural 
Households ($) 
Percent More 
that Rural 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 1,308.80 1,221.07 1,687.73 38.2 
20-40 2,157.75 1,927.11 3,032.01 57.3 
40-60 2,671.16 2,420.95 3,607.91 49.0 
60-100 3,220.65 2,866.78 4,366.12 52.3 
100+ 3,507.32 3,117.59 4,758.22 52.6 
Total 2,576.46 2,296.66 3,588.31 56.2 
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Table 44. Difference between Rural Vehicle-Owning Households and Urban Vehicle-
Owning Households for the Static and Dynamic Model of Scenario 2 
Household Income Level 
($1,000s) 
Static Scenario 2 Percent 
More that Rural Vehicle-
Owning Households Pay than 
Urban Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
Dynamic Scenario 2 Percent 
More that Rural Vehicle-
Owning Households Pay than 
Urban Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 15.5 38.2 
20-40 39.9 57.3 
40-60 34.5 49.0 
60-100 33.5 52.3 
100+ 31.3 52.6 
Total 36.6 56.2 
 
 
 
 
Table 45. Difference between Rural Vehicle-Owning Households and Urban Vehicle-
Owning Households for the Dynamic Model of Scenarios 1 and 2 
Household Income Level 
($1,000s) 
Dynamic Scenario 1 Percent 
More that Rural Vehicle-
Owning Households Pay than 
Urban Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
Dynamic Scenario 2 Percent 
More that Rural Vehicle-
Owning Households Pay than 
Urban Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 16.3 38.2 
20-40 40.7 57.3 
40-60 35.1 49.0 
60-100 34.2 52.3 
100+ 32.1 52.6 
Total 37.3 56.2 
 
 
 Based on the results displayed in Table 44 and Table 45 it is evident that rural 
vehicle-owning households pay more than their urban vehicle-owning household 
counterparts within the same household income level.  The comparison illustrated in 
Table 44 indicates that the difference is more exaggerated under the dynamic model than 
under the static model—largely because urban households tend to have larger elasticity 
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magnitudes than their rural household counterparts in the same household income level.  
Thus, their larger percentage decrease in travel contributes toward them paying less per 
household.  The reason that percent differences in household pay is more exaggerated in 
dynamic model results of Scenario 2 than Scenario1 also stems from the larger elasticity 
magnitude associated with urban households.  As the total price of gasoline (including 
the VMT fee) increases more drastically, households with large elasticities will decrease 
their VMT more drastically than those households with small elasticities.   
Static Scenario 3 
  The weighted average annual VMT fee revenue from vehicle-owning households 
under the static model of Scenario 3 is shown in Table 46.   
 
 
Table 46. Static Scenario 3:  Weighted Average Annual VMT Fee Revenue from 
Vehicle-Owning Households 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-
Owning 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Urban 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Rural 
Households ($) 
Percent More 
that Rural 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 1,438.69 1,383.95 1,675.12 21.0 
20-40 2,039.97 1,843.33 2,785.37 51.1 
40-60 2,502.18 2,308.13 3,228.67 39.9 
60-100 3,247.02 2,971.96 4,137.39 39.2 
100+ 3,637.62 3,355.51 4,543.12 35.4 
Total 2,576.46 2,357.29 3,369.05 42.9 
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Dynamic Scenario 3 
The weighted average annual VMT fee revenue from vehicle-owning households 
under the dynamic model of Scenario 3 is presented in Table 47 and the result of each 
iteration included in the dynamic model of Scenario 3 are provided in Table 48. 
   
Table 47. Dynamic Scenario 3:  Weighted Average Annual VMT Fee Revenue from 
Vehicle-Owning Households 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-
Owning 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Urban 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Rural 
Households ($) 
Percent More 
that Rural 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 1,314.39 1,218.66 1,727.89 41.8 
20-40 2,129.93 1,870.37 3,113.82 66.5 
40-60 2,644.93 2,378.13 3,643.78 53.2 
60-100 3,245.63 2,861.56 4,488.87 56.9 
100+ 3,529.82 3,119.92 4,845.46 55.3 
Total 2,576.46 2,275.10 3,666.26 61.2 
 
 
 
Table 48. VMT Fee Assessed as Part of Scenario 3 by Iteration and Fuel Economy 
Iteration Number 
Fee Assessed to 
Vehicles with Fuel 
Economy Lower than 
the Median ($) 
Fee Assessed to 
Vehicles with Fuel 
Economy Greater 
Than or Equal to the 
Median and Less or 
Equal to the Mean ($) 
Fee Assessed to 
Vehicles with Fuel 
Economy Higher 
than the Mean ($) 
Original 0.020 0.015 0.010 
1 0.1541176 0.1155882 0.0770588 
2 0.1977567 0.1483175 0.0988784 
3 0.1972839 0.1479629 0.0986420 
4 0.1973691 0.1480268 0.0986845 
5 0.1973570 0.1480178 0.0986785 
6 0.1973589 0.1480192 0.0986795 
7 0.1973586 0.1480190 0.0986793 
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Static Scenario 4  
 The weighted average annual VMT fee revenue per vehicle-owning household 
with the static model—under the 80/20 Scenario 4 assumption—is presented in Table 
49.  Recall that the 80/20 assumption implies that 80 percent of urban household travel is 
assumed to be on urban roadways and 80 percent of rural household travel is assumed to 
be on rural household roadways.  
 
 
Table 49. Static Scenario 4 (80/20 Assumption):  Weighted Average Annual VMT Fee 
Revenue from Vehicle-Owning Households 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-
Owning 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Urban 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Rural 
Households ($) 
Percent More 
that Rural 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 1,464.62 1,494.20 1,336.87 -10.5 
20-40 2,072.33 2,036.71 2,207.36 8.4 
40-60 2,527.08 2,504.81 2,610.46 4.2 
60-100 3,204.02 3,178.55 3,286.47 3.4 
100+ 3,600.07 3,585.41 3,647.13 1.7 
Total 2,576.46 2,544.52 2,691.97 5.8 
 
 
 
The weighted average annual VMT fee revenue per vehicle-owning household 
obtained using the static model for Scenario 4 under the 70/30 assumption are shown in 
Table 50.  Recall that similar to the 80/20 assumption description given previously, the 
70/30 assumption implies that 70 percent of urban household travel is on urban 
roadways while 70 percent of rural household travel is on rural roadways. 
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Table 50.  Static Scenario 4 (70/30 Assumption):  Weighted Average Annual VMT Fee 
Revenue from Vehicle-Owning Households 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-
Owning 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Urban 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Rural 
Households ($) 
Percent More 
that Rural 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 1,462.69 1,486.03 1,361.86 -8.4 
20-40 2,072.13 2,025.56 2,248.63 11.0 
40-60 2,526.56 2,491.11 2,659.27 6.8 
60-100 3,205.24 3,161.17 3,347.92 5.9 
100+ 3,601.32 3,565.80 3,715.32 4.2 
Total 2,576.46 2,530.61 2,742.30 8.4 
 
 
Dynamic Scenario 4 
The dynamic model results for Scenario 4 showing the weighted average annual 
VMT fee revenue from vehicle-owning households included in this analysis under the 
80/20 assumption are shown in Table 51.  The VMT fees established for both urban 
roadways and rural roadways after each iteration of the dynamic model under the 80/20 
assumption are summarized in Table 52.  Note that a constraint was implemented to 
ensure that the largest magnitude percent change in VMT was 100 percent.  This ensured 
that changes in travel behavior more closely reflected reality; with vehicles unable to 
drive negative miles.  This constraint was not necessary in dynamic scenarios other than 
Scenario 4 because dynamic changes in VMT magnitude did not exceed 100 percent.       
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Table 51. Dynamic Scenario 4 (80/20 Assumption):  Weighted Average Annual VMT 
Fee Revenue from Vehicle-Owning Households 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-
Owning 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Urban 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Rural 
Households ($) 
Percent More 
that Rural 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 1,318.83 1,293.79 1,427.02 10.3 
20-40 2,166.52 2,073.07 2,520.74 21.6 
40-60 2,690.86 2,609.41 2,995.79 14.8 
60-100 3,207.31 3,069.40 3,653.73 19.0 
100+ 3,484.60 3,325.17 3,996.34 20.2 
Total 2,576.46 2,459.12 3,000.80 22.0 
 
 
 
 
Table 52. Urban Roadway VMT Fee and Rural Roadway VMT Fee by Iteration under 
the 80/20 Assumption 
Iteration 
Number 
Urban Roadway 
VMT Fee ($) 
Rural Roadway 
VMT Fee ($) 
Largest 
Magnitude 
Percent Change 
in VMT 
Percent Higher 
the Urban 
Roadway Fee is 
than the Rural 
Roadway Fee 
(%) 
1 0.1324599 0.0862066 -100.00 53.7 
2 0.1805112 0.1069447 32.29 68.8 
3 0.1797693 0.1072499 -3.33 67.6 
4 0.1798953 0.1072489 0.62 67.7 
5 0.1798788 0.1072481 -0.12 67.7 
6 0.1798814 0.1072484 0.02 67.7 
7 0.1798810 0.1072483 -0.005 67.7 
 
 
 
 
The results for Scenario 4 are provided in Table 53—showing the weighted 
average annual VMT fee revenue from vehicle-owning vehicles included in this analysis 
under the 70/30 assumption.  The VMT fees established for both urban roadways and 
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rural roadways after each iteration of the dynamic model under the 70/30 assumption are 
outlined in Table 54.  Note that the same constraint described previously for Table 52 
was also applied to Table 54.  Scenario 4 was designed to inherently possess horizontal 
equity, by more closely linking fees to type of roadway use, as will be further discussed 
later in this chapter. 
 
Table 53. Dynamic Scenario 4 (70/30 Assumption):  Weighted Average Annual VMT 
Fee Revenue from Vehicle-Owning Households 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-
Owning 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Urban 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-
Owning Rural 
Households ($) 
Percent More 
that Rural 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households Pay 
than Urban 
Vehicle-Owning 
Households (%) 
<20 1,316.49 1,279.58 1,475.88 15.3 
20-40 2,165.14 2,047.14 2,612.44 27.6 
40-60 2,687.76 2,576.21 3,105.34 20.5 
60-100 3,209.82 3,032.55 3,783.64 24.8 
100+ 3,488.47 3,286.55 4,136.56 25.9 
Total 2,576.46 2,429.55 3,107.74 27.9 
 
 
 
Table 54. Urban Roadway VMT Fee and Rural Roadway VMT Fee by Iteration under 
the 70/30 Assumption 
Iteration 
Number 
Urban Roadway 
VMT Fee ($) 
Rural Roadway 
VMT Fee ($) 
Largest 
Magnitude 
Percent Change 
in VMT 
Percent Higher 
the Urban 
Roadway Fee is 
than the Rural 
Roadway Fee 
(%) 
1 0.1415052 0.0782721 -100.00 80.8 
2 0.1905643 0.0994015 32.24 91.7 
3 0.1898089 0.0995447 -3.33 90.7 
4 0.1899498 0.0995569 0.62 90.8 
5 0.1899310 0.0995547 -0.12 90.8 
6 0.1899340 0.0995552 0.02 90.8 
7 0.1899335 0.0995551 -0.005 90.8 
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 The percent increase in the average annual amount assessed per household in the 
form of a VMT fee versus the state gas tax is shown in Table 55 for the static results and 
in Table 56 for the dynamic results.  The scenario with the smallest percent increase 
experienced by each household income level quintile coincides with the results 
explained later in Table 57 and Table 58.   
 
Table 55. Percent Increase in the Average Annual Amount Assessed per Household in 
the Form of a VMT Fee versus the State Gas Tax for the Static Models (%) 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 under 
80/20 Assumption 
Scenario 4 under 
70/30 Assumption 
Urb Rur Urb Rur Urb Rur Urb Rur Urb Rur 
<20 41.3 38.6 1,045.1 1,023.0 1,030.4 1,061.9 1,120.5 827.3 1,113.8 844.6 
20-40 44.8 36.3 1,073.7 1,004.9 1,032.1 1,051.2 1,150.9 812.3 1,144.0 829.4 
40-60 43.4 39.9 1,062.4 1,034.2 1,041.6 1,058.3 1,138.9 836.5 1,132.1 854.0 
60-100 43.1 39.3 1,059.8 1,029.2 1,055.7 1,073.9 1,136.1 832.5 1,129.3 849.9 
100+ 43.3 40.2 1,061.6 1,036.3 1,058.7 1,068.8 1,138.1 838.3 1,131.3 855.8 
Total 43.3 39.1 1,061.5 1,027.1 1,046.8 1,064.8 1,137.9 830.7 1,131.1 848.1 
 
 
 
Table 56. Percent Increase in the Average Annual Amount Assessed per Household in 
the Form of a VMT Fee versus the State Gas Tax for the Dynamic Models (%) 
Household 
Income Level 
($1,000s) 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 under 
80/20 Assumption 
Scenario 4 under 
70/30 Assumption 
Urb Rur Urb Rur Urb Rur Urb Rur Urb Rur 
<20 40.6 38.8 897.4 1,070.7 895.4 1,098.5 956.8 889.8 945.2 923.7 
20-40 44.8 37.1 1,083.6 1,153.2 1,048.7 1,187.0 1,173.2 941.8 1,157.3 979.7 
40-60 43.6 40.7 1,097.4 1,194.4 1,076.2 1,207.2 1,190.6 974.8 1,174.2 1,014.1 
60-100 42.9 39.9 1,014.8 1,138.8 1,012.8 1,173.6 1,093.6 936.7 1,079.3 973.5 
100+ 42.9 40.6 976.5 1,124.1 977.3 1,146.6 1,048.2 928.1 1,034.9 964.2 
Total 43.1 39.6 1,017.3 1,140.6 1,006.8 1,167.5 1,096.4 937.4 1,082.0 974.4 
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An overall “winners” and “losers” summary for the static results and the dynamic 
results are shown in Table 57 and Table 58, respectively—where winners coincide to the 
scenario where a given household type experiences the smallest percent increase in 
annual average VMT fee as compared to the state gas tax.  As with Table 55 and Table 
56, these findings coincide with the results presented in the next section where only the 
scenarios designed to generate additional net revenue are considered (Scenarios 2-4).  
 
 
Table 57. “Winners” and “Losers” for the Static Models 
 (1= “Winner” and 5= “Loser”) 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
under 80/20 
Assumption 
Scenario 4 
under 70/30 
Assumption 
Urb Rur Urb Rur Urb Rur Urb Rur Urb Rur 
<20 1 1 3 4 2 5 5 2 4 3 
20-40 1 1 3 4 2 5 5 2 4 3 
40-60 1 1 3 4 2 5 5 2 4 3 
60-100 1 1 3 4 2 5 5 2 4 3 
100+ 1 1 3 4 2 5 5 2 4 3 
Total 1 1 3 4 2 5 5 2 4 3 
 
 
 
Table 58. “Winners” and “Losers” for the Dynamic Models  
(1= “Winner” and 5= “Loser”) 
Household 
Income 
Level 
($1,000s) 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 
under 80/20 
Assumption 
Scenario 4 
under 70/30 
Assumption 
Urb Rur Urb Rur Urb Rur Urb Rur Urb Rur 
<20 1 1 3 4 2 5 5 2 4 3 
20-40 1 1 3 4 2 5 5 2 4 3 
40-60 1 1 3 4 2 5 5 2 4 3 
60-100 1 1 3 4 2 5 5 2 4 3 
100+ 1 1 2 4 3 5 5 2 4 3 
Total 1 1 3 4 2 5 5 2 4 3 
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COMPARISON OF ADDITIONAL REVENUE SCENARIOS 
 A closer comparison of Scenarios 2-4 is merited because even though all of these 
scenarios generate the same total amount of revenue, their underlying philosophies vary 
greatly and their impacts vary by household geographic location.  In essence, their equity 
impacts differ.  The static scenario that results in the lowest weighted average annual 
household VMT fee from vehicle-owning households, disaggregated by both household 
income level and household geographic location is shown in Table 59.   
 
 
Table 59.  Most Favorable Static Scenario—Disaggregated by Household Income Level 
and Household Geographic Location—Designed to Increase Revenue 
Household Income 
Level ($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-Owning 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-Owning 
Urban Households ($) 
All Vehicle-Owning 
Rural Households ($) 
<20 Scenario 3 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 80/20 Assumption 
20-40 Scenario 3 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 80/20 Assumption 
40-60 Scenario 3 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 80/20 Assumption 
60-100 Scenario 4 80/20 Assumption Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 80/20 
Assumption 
100+ Scenario 4 80/20 Assumption Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 80/20 
Assumption 
Total Same for All Scenarios Scenario 3 Scenario 4 80/20 Assumption 
 
 
 First of all, note that the total weighted average annual vehicle-owning household 
VMT fee revenue is the same for all four scenarios designed to generate revenue in 
addition to that already collected through the state gas tax from the vehicles included in 
the analysis.  What differs is that each scenario results in different changes to the 
household tax/fee paid.  Interestingly, across all vehicle-owning urban household income 
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levels, Scenario 3 in the smallest increase.  Because Scenario 3 is designed to reward and 
encourage the use of fuel-efficient vehicles, this supports the idea that urban households 
tend to drive more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
By contrast, the most beneficial revenue generating static scenario for rural 
households was Scenario 4 with the 80/20 assumption.  A larger ratio of the desired 
annual $14.3 billion increase in revenue was earmarked to urban roadways fees.  Under 
both the 80/20 assumption and the 70/30 assumption, the urban roadway VMT fee was 
calculated to be higher than the rural roadway VMT fee.  Urban households were 
assumed to drive a larger percentage of their VMT on urban roadways and rural 
households were assumed to drive a larger percentage of their VMT on rural roadways.  
Thus, it makes sense that the lower VMT fee assigned to rural roadways would 
contribute towards an economically beneficial scenario for rural households.  The results 
also indicate that under the static model assumption, rural households benefitted from 
the lower VMT fee assigned to rural roadways more under the 80/20 assumption than 
under the 70/30 assumption—indicating that the 10 percent increase in urban roadway 
travel resulted in less of a benefit to rural households.    
The same results shown in Table 60 are shown in Table 59; with the only 
difference being that the Table 60 results correspond to the dynamic model rather than 
the static model.  Vehicle-owning urban households have a greater propensity to lower 
their VMT as the total price of gas (including the cost of the proposed VMT fees) 
increases, when compared to vehicle-owning rural households.  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that greater disparity in the weighted average annual VMT fee revenue is seen 
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between vehicle-owning urban households and vehicle-owning rural households within 
the same household income level under the dynamic model versus the static model.  
While Scenario 3 is still the most beneficial for vehicle-owning urban households 
overall, vehicle-owning urban households within household income level quintile 5 
actually benefit the most from Scenario 2 under the dynamic model (although the 
difference between Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 is small).  This may be a reflection of the 
percentage of miles that fuel efficient vehicles are driven by high income urban vehicle-
owning households.  Just because this household subcategory has a higher average 
vehicle fuel-economy than households with a lower household income level, does not 
necessarily dictate how much they use their fuel efficient vehicles. 
Interestingly, Scenario 2 is the most beneficial dynamic model when considering 
all vehicle-owning households with household income level quintile 1, even though 
Scenario 2 is not the most beneficial for this lowest household income level for either 
vehicle-owning urban households or vehicle-owning rural households considered 
separately.  This is an indication that while Scenario 3 benefited vehicle-owning urban 
households with household income level quintile 1 the most monetarily, it had the most 
negative monetary impact on vehicle-owning rural households within the same 
household income level when considering the four scenarios designed to generate 
additional revenue.  Likewise, while Scenario 4 under the 80/20 assumption benefited 
vehicle-owning rural households the most monetarily, it was the most monetarily hurtful 
revenue generating scenario for vehicle-owning urban households.  Thus, as a more 
moderate scenario for all vehicle-owning households with household income level 
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quintile 1, Scenario 2 is the most monetarily desirable scenario designed to generate 
additional net revenue when considering dynamic models. 
 
 
Table 60. Most Favorable Dynamic Scenario—Disaggregated by Household Income 
Level and Household Geographic Location—Designed to Increase Revenue 
Household Income 
Level ($1,000s) 
All Vehicle-Owning 
Households ($) 
All Vehicle-Owning 
Urban Households 
($) 
All Vehicle-Owning 
Rural Households ($) 
<20 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 80/20 
Assumption 
20-40 Scenario 3 Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 80/20 
Assumption 
40-60 Scenario 3 Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 80/20 
Assumption 
60-100 
Scenario 4 80/20 
Assumption 
Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 80/20 
Assumption 
100+ 
Scenario 4 80/20 
Assumption 
Scenario 2 
Scenario 4 80/20 
Assumption 
Total Same for All Scenarios Scenario 3 
Scenario 4 80/20 
Assumption 
 
 
GINI COEFFICIENTS AND VERTICAL EQUITY 
 As mentioned in Chapter II, the Gini Coefficient (G) was calculated for each 
scenario and compared relative to the state gas tax to determine whether it was 
quantitatively more or less vertically equitable than the current state gas tax system.    
Recall that a G value close to 0 is indicative that the Lorenz Curve plot is close to the 
line of equity.  By contrast, the closer G is to 1 the further the Lorenz Curve is from the 
line of equity and the more progressive the scenario (see Equation (1) and Figure 1 for 
relevant calculation explanations and schematics).  The results are shown in Table 61. 
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Table 61. Gini Coefficients for Texas Vehicle-Owning Households in 2008 under 
Various Transportation Fee Scenarios
Scenario Gini Coefficient (G) Description of Results 
Static Scenario 3 0.1734 
Most Progressive (Scenario 
where high income households 
pay larger percentage of state 
gas tax or VMT fees than any 
other scenario) 
Dynamic Scenario 3 0.1712 
 
Static Scenario 1 0.1697 
 
Static Scenario 2 0.1697 
 
Dynamic Scenario 1 0.1692 
 
Gas Tax 0.1687 
 
Dynamic Scenario 2 0.1684 
 
Static Scenario 4, 70/30 0.1672 
 
Static Scenario 4, 80/20 0.1670 
 
Dynamic Scenario 4, 70/30 0.1661 
 
Dynamic Scenario 4, 80/20 0.1656 
Most Regressive (Scenario 
where high income households 
pay smaller percentage of state 
gas tax or VMT fees than any 
other scenario) 
 
 
 
 The information displayed in Table 61 is especially useful if analyzed in relation 
to the current state gas tax.  As seen in Table 61, it appears that half of the VMT fee 
scenarios are more progressive than the current state gas tax system, while half are more 
regressive than the current state gas tax system.  All variations of Scenario 4, as well as 
Dynamic Scenario 2 are more regressive than the state gas tax.  Scenario 3 is the most 
progressive scenario.  Note that Static Scenario 1 and Static Scenario 2 have the same G 
value—as is to be expected given that the only difference between the two scenarios is a 
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scaling factor.   Although the results shown in Table 61 make it possible to compare the 
vertical equity of each scenario, conclusions should be drawn from a practical 
standpoint.  The tight range of G values (difference between max and min values totaling 
0.0078) is an indication that all of the analyzed VMT fee scenarios are essentially as 
equally vertically equitable as the current state gas tax system.  All scenarios (including 
the state gas tax) are progressive in nature, largely due to the fact that higher income 
households own more vehicles, and thus contribute more towards the total state gas tax 
revenue.  However, it is important to understand that the term “progressive” in this case 
is used to indicate that higher income household quintiles pay more of the overall state 
gas tax revenue; not the broader meaning that lower income households pay a lower 
percentage of their overall household income on the transportation fee.     
 
HORIZONTAL EQUITY 
 Scenario 4 was designed to inherently achieve horizontal equity because all 
vehicles, regardless of which type of household they belong to, pay the designated fees 
unique to urban roadways and rural roadways.  In turn, the revenue from each roadway 
fee goes back to improving the mobility and infrastructure of that area type with the 
revenue amount dictated by the disaggregation of roadway type needs (urban roadway, 
rural roadway, shared).  Thus, this type of design is one form of the “equal treatment of 
equals (Toutkoushian and Michael, 2007)”.  Scenario 4 was used as the benchmark in 
quantitatively assessing the relative horizontal equity of each scenario, disaggregated in 
terms of household geographic location.  The horizontal equity results corresponding to 
 124 
the static models are shown in Table 62, while the horizontal equity results 
corresponding to the dynamic models are shown in Table 63.  The actual revenue totals 
generated under the state gas tax and the VMT fee scenarios are presented in Table 64.   
 
Table 62. Horizontal Equity Comparison of Urban Households and Rural Households 
for Static Models  
Scenario 
Percentage of 
Total Revenue 
Collected from 
Urban 
Households 
Percentage of 
Total Revenue 
Collected from 
Rural 
Households 
Comments 
Increase in 
Percent Rural 
Households Pay 
versus Scenario 
4 (80/20, 70/30) 
(%) 
Static Scenario 4 
80/20 
77.4 22.6 
Horizontally 
Equitable under 
Scenario 4 80/20 
Assumption 
(0,-0.5) 
Static Scenario 4 
70/30 
76.9 23.1 
Horizontally 
Equitable under 
Scenario 4 70/30 
Assumption 
(0.5,0) 
Static Scenario 2 72.6 27.4  (4.8,4.3) 
Static Scenario 1 72.6 27.4  (4.8,4.3) 
State Gas Tax 72.0 28.0  (5.4,4.9) 
Static Scenario 3 71.7 28.3 
Rural Households 
Affected Most 
Negatively 
(5.7,5.2) 
 
 
 
Table 63.  Horizontal Equity Comparison of Urban Households and Rural Households 
for Dynamic Models 
Scenario 
Percentage of 
Total Revenue 
Collected from 
Urban 
Households 
Percentage of 
Total Revenue 
Collected from 
Rural 
Households 
Comments 
Increase in 
Percent Rural 
Households Pay 
versus Scenario 
4 (80/20, 70/30) 
(%) 
Dynamic 
Scenario 4 80/20 
74.8 25.2 
Horizontally 
Equitable under 
Scenario 4 80/20 
Assumption 
(0,-0.9) 
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Table 63. cont. 
Scenario 
Percentage of 
Total Revenue 
Collected from 
Urban 
Households 
Percentage of 
Total Revenue 
Collected from 
Rural 
Households 
Comments 
Difference in 
Percentage of Rural 
Household Revenue 
under Scenario 4 
(80/20, 70/30) versus 
the Scenario in 
Question (%) 
Dynamic 
Scenario 4 
70/30 
73.9 26.1 
Horizontally 
Equitable under 
Scenario 4 70/30 
Assumption 
(0.9,0) 
Dynamic 
Scenario 1 
72.5 27.5  (2.3,1.4) 
Dynamic 
Scenario 2 
69.8 30.2  (5.0,4.1) 
Dynamic 
Scenario 3 
69.2 30.8 
Rural Households 
Affected Most 
Negatively 
(5.6,4.7) 
 
 
 
 
Table 64. Total Revenue Generated by Urban Households and Rural Households 
Scenario 
Total Revenue 
Generated from 
Either State Gas 
Tax or VMT Fee 
from All 
Households ($) 
Total Revenue 
Generated from 
Either State Gas 
Tax or VMT Fee 
from Urban 
Households ($) 
Total Revenue 
Generated from 
Either State Gas 
Tax or VMT Fee 
from Rural 
Households ($) 
Difference in 
Total Revenue 
Generated by 
Urban 
Households 
versus Rural 
Households ($) 
State Gas Tax 1,770,254,297 1,274,355,697 495,898,600 778,457,097 
Static 
Scenario 1 
2,515,974,912 1,826,336,305 689,638,607 1,136,697,698 
Dynamic 
Scenario 1 
2,515,974,912 1,823,514,940 692,459,972 1,131,054,968 
Static 
Scenario 2 
20,390,974,912 14,801,728,586 5,589,246,326 9,212,482,260 
Dynamic 
Scenario 2 
20,390,974,912 14,238,989,580 6,151,985,332 8,087,004,248 
Static 
Scenario 3 
20,390,974,912 14,614,900,960 5,776,073,952 8,838,827,008 
Dynamic 
Scenario 3 
20,390,974,912 14,105,345,464 6,285,629,449 7,819,716,015 
Static 
Scenario 4 (80/20 
Assumption) 
20,390,974,912 15,775,719,071 4,615,255,841 11,160,463,230 
Dynamic 
Scenario 4 (80/20 
Assumption) 
20,390,974,912 15,246,247,536 5,144,727,376 10,101,520,160 
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Table 64. cont. 
Scenario 
Total Revenue 
Generated from 
Either State Gas 
Tax or VMT Fee 
from All 
Households ($) 
Total Revenue 
Generated from 
Either State Gas 
Tax or VMT Fee 
from Urban 
Households ($) 
Total Revenue 
Generated from 
Either State Gas 
Tax or VMT Fee 
from Rural 
Households ($) 
Difference in 
Total Revenue 
Generated by 
Urban 
Households 
versus Rural 
Households ($) 
Static 
Scenario 4 (70/30 
Assumption) 
20,390,974,912 15,689,428,332 4,701,546,580 10,987,881,752 
Dynamic 
Scenario 4 (70/30 
Assumption) 
20,390,974,912 15,062,890,024 5,328,084,888 9,734,805,136 
 
 
 For both the static model (Table 62) and the dynamic model (Table 63), Scenario 
3 causes rural households to pay the largest percentage of the total revenue collected 
under any scenario of the same model type.  Additionally, both the static model and the 
dynamic model of Scenario 3 are less horizontally equitable than the state gas tax, under 
the 80/20 assumption.  Likewise, the static model of Scenario 3 is less horizontally 
equitable that the state gas tax under the 70/30 assumption.  Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 
are equally horizontally equitable under the static model because the only difference 
between the structure of Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 is a scaling factor, which does not 
affect revenue percentages.  However, under the dynamic model Scenario 2 displays less 
horizontal equity than Scenario 1, as rural households pay a higher percentage under 
Scenario 2.  This observation is largely explained by the fact that larger elasticities are 
associated with urban households.  Therefore, urban households tend to decrease their 
VMT more drastically than rural households when the cost of travel increases (as was 
the case for all scenarios), which decreases the amount of revenue generated from urban 
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households and subsequently increases the percentage of the total revenue collected from 
rural households. 
 
COMPARATIVE REVENUE AND VMT 
The vehicle miles traveled by each household type, disaggregated by household 
income level and household geographic location, are provided in Tables 65-70. The total 
VMT is identical under the state gas tax system and the static VMT fee scenarios 
because, by definition, the static models assume no change in VMT due to changes in 
the transportation fee.  Notice that the dynamic model total VMT values are lower for 
the dynamic models of Scenarios 2-4 than for the dynamic model of Scenario 1.  This is 
because the fees imposed on households to achieve additional revenue desired for 
mobility and infrastructure improvements result in a decrease in VMT.     
 
 
Table 65. State Gas Tax and Static Models‟ Annual VMT 
Household Income 
Level ($1,000s) 
Total VMT for All 
Households 
(miles) 
Total VMT for 
Urban Households 
(miles) 
Total VMT for Rural 
Households (miles) 
<20 18,831,170,512 14,858,666,451 3,972,504,061 
20-40 32,095,312,144 23,443,683,443 8,651,628,700 
40-60 29,808,015,562 21,928,785,374 7,879,230,187 
60-100 47,387,290,767 33,553,900,976 13,833,389,791 
100+ 48,267,233,003 34,255,061,899 14,012,171,104 
Total 176,389,021,988 128,040,098,144 48,348,923,844 
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Table 66. Dynamic Scenario 1 Annual VMT 
Household Income 
Level ($1,000s) 
Total VMT for All 
Households 
(miles) 
Total VMT for 
Urban Households 
(miles) 
Total VMT for Rural 
Households (miles) 
<20 18,567,889,623 14,629,844,025 3,938,045,599 
20-40 31,801,161,527 23,194,393,559 8,606,767,968 
40-60 29,555,407,730 21,717,517,730 7,837,890,000 
60-100 46,879,022,290 33,141,360,004 13,737,662,286 
100+ 47,692,634,464 33,787,269,407 13,905,365,056 
Total 174,496,115,634 126,470,384,725 48,025,730,909 
 
 
 
 
Table 67. Dynamic Scenario 2 Annual VMT 
Household Income 
Level ($1,000s) 
Total VMT for All 
Households 
(miles) 
Total VMT for Urban 
Households (miles) 
Total VMT for Rural 
Households (miles) 
<20 13,136,792,949 9,952,198,843 3,184,594,106 
20-40 25,727,121,625 18,180,853,245 7,546,268,379 
40-60 24,286,561,504 17,371,460,682 6,915,100,822 
60-100 36,473,852,291 24,803,843,005 11,670,010,286 
100+ 36,021,121,573 24,412,642,804 11,608,478,769 
Total 135,645,449,942 94,720,997,580 40,924,452,362 
 
 
 
Table 68. Dynamic Scenario 3 Annual VMT 
Household Income 
Level ($1,000s) 
Total VMT for All 
Households 
(miles) 
Total VMT for Urban 
Households (miles) 
Total VMT for Rural 
Households (miles) 
<20 13,586,975,970 10,367,862,758 3,219,113,212 
20-40 26,311,963,039 18,729,298,792 7,582,664,247 
40-60 24,747,718,177 17,778,017,986 6,969,700,190 
60-100 37,252,383,978 25,483,938,167 11,768,445,810 
100+ 36,897,620,413 25,166,492,302 11,731,128,111 
Total 138,796,661,576 97,525,610,005 41,271,051,572 
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Table 69. Dynamic Scenario 4 under 80/20 Assumption Annual VMT 
Household Income 
Level ($1,000s) 
Total VMT for All 
Households 
(miles) 
Total VMT for Urban 
Households (miles) 
Total VMT for Rural 
Households (miles) 
<20 12,910,398,406 9,586,436,214 3,323,962,192 
20-40 25,524,987,819 17,780,294,024 7,744,693,795 
40-60 24,110,035,065 17,021,942,495 7,088,092,570 
60-100 36,198,714,049 24,143,184,544 12,055,529,505 
100+ 35,707,116,387 23,671,526,617 12,035,589,770 
Total 134,451,251,726 92,203,383,894 42,247,867,832 
 
 
 
Table 70. Dynamic Scenario 4 under 70/30 Assumption Annual VMT 
Household Income 
Level ($1,000s) 
Total VMT for All 
Households 
(miles) 
Total VMT for 
Urban Households 
(miles) 
Total VMT for Rural 
Households (miles) 
<20 12,933,768,333 9,628,796,123 3,304,972,210 
20-40 25,547,547,530 17,831,211,701 7,716,335,829 
40-60 24,130,443,684 17,067,019,460 7,063,424,224 
60-100 36,226,508,242 24,224,647,732 12,001,860,510 
100+ 35,737,423,257 23,760,817,244 11,976,606,013 
Total 134,575,691,046 92,512,492,260 42,063,198,786 
 
 
The ranking from lowest to highest (1=lowest) of total household VMT for all 
households are shown in Table 71.  The overall ranking results were the same regardless 
of household income level.  It could be argued that the scenario that causes the total 
household VMT to decrease most drastically is the most detrimental to a particular 
household type because it is causing the households to limit their travel, and is therefore 
inconveniencing them.  However, for the purposes of this analysis this level of equity 
 130 
analysis was not considered, but the rankings based on VMT are provided for 
comparison purposes (see Table 71).   
From Table 71 it is evident that the dynamic model of Scenario 4 causes the 
largest decrease in the VMT of all households; with a more drastic decrease in overall 
VMT experienced under the 80/20 assumption than the 70/30 assumption.  The same 
result can be seen when only considering urban households.  These identical rankings for 
all households and just urban households is not surprising because urban households 
make-up a majority of the vehicle-owning population in Texas, which causes the urban 
household ranking results to more heavily affect the overall results.  Of all the dynamic 
models designed to generate additional revenue needed for improvements, Scenario 3 
causes the smallest decrease in urban household VMT.  For rural households, the 
dynamic model of Scenario 2 causes the greatest decrease in VMT, while Scenario 4 
under the 80/20 assumption causes the smallest decrease in rural household VMT of all 
of the dynamic models designed to generate revenue needed for improvements.         
 
 
Table 71. Ranking of Lowest to Highest VMT for All Households (1=Lowest) 
Households 
Considered 
in Ranking 
State Gas 
Tax 
Dynamic 
Scenario 
1 
Dynamic 
Scenario 
2 
Dynamic 
Scenario 
3 
Dynamic 
Scenario 4 
under 80/20 
Assumption 
Dynamic 
Scenario 4 
under 70/30 
Assumption 
All 6 5 3 4 1 2 
Urban 6 5 3 4 1 2 
Rural 6 5 1 2 4 3 
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 SUMMARY 
Chapter IV has explained the structure of each VMT fee scenario, the anticipated 
costs of converting to a VMT fee system in place of the state gas tax, and how 
elasticities were obtained for use in calculating the dynamic model results.   Tables 
displaying comparative results were presented and discussed.  Specifically, differences 
between Scenarios 2-4 were examined, and analysis into the most beneficial scenario for 
each household type was presented.  From a quantitative perspective the vertical equity 
of each scenario was assessed by calculating the scenario‟s Gini Coefficients—which 
seem to indicate that all proposed scenarios are essentially just as vertically equitable as 
the current state gas tax system.  The relative horizontal equity was assessed for each 
scenario, under the assumption that Scenario 4 was inherently designed to be 
horizontally equitable.  Scenario 3 is less horizontally equitable than the current state gas 
tax system under the 80/20 assumption for both the static and dynamic models; and 
under the 70/30 assumption for the static model.         
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATONS 
 
 Replacing the gas tax with a VMT fee is under serious consideration as policy-
makers work to establish a transportation fee system that (a) holds motorists more 
accountable for their use of the infrastructure and (b) provides the funding required to 
keep the transportation system functioning effectively.  As with any new idea, there is 
the need to examine potential issues with VMT fee scenarios.  These include, but are not 
limited to, the fee system‟s ability to capture needed revenue, the method of fee 
collection, privacy concerns in the VMT fee collection process, the anticipated impact 
on the environment, and equity impacts.  This research utilized 2009 NHTS data to 
analyze the equity impacts associated with replacing the Texas state gas tax with a VMT 
fee for gasoline-run vehicles.  Four different general scenarios were implemented and 
the resulting changes in fees for households grouped by both household income level 
and household geographic location were estimated.  The results were weighted to reflect 
all Texas vehicle-owning households for the year 2008. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
No one proposed VMT fee scenario affects all households uniformly.  Thus, it is 
imperative that VMT fee goals be adequately determined prior to assessing the equity 
impacts of proposed VMT fee scenarios.  A list of potential VMT fee scenario goals for 
policy-makers to use as a starting point in creating their own goals was provided in 
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Chapter IV.  The following section briefly addresses each of these goals and in the 
process highlights some of the pros and cons associated with each VMT fee scenario.    
 
EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL VMT FEE GOALS 
 Establish Horizontal Equity:  As explained in Chapter IV, Scenario 4 was 
designed to be inherently horizontally equitable.  The VMT fee associated with 
each roadway type is reflective of the revenue desired for mobility and 
infrastructure improvements either specific to that roadway type or that address a 
shared need.  Scenario 3, a scenario that favored vehicles with high fuel 
efficiency, was found to be the least horizontally equitable.    
 Establish Vertical Equity:  The Gini Coefficient was calculated for each 
scenario and compared relative to the current state gas tax to assess whether each 
VMT fee scenario was more or less vertically equitable.  The similar Gini 
Coefficients obtained for each scenario were an indication that all of the VMT 
fee scenarios were essentially as equally vertically equitable as the current state 
gas tax system. 
 Familiarize travelers with the VMT fee concept:  This goal would likely be 
achieved under Scenario 1, because although no additional net revenue would be 
generated, it would help motorists become familiar with the VMT fee system.  
As motorists become more accepting of the VMT fee system, the potential would 
increase for changes in the design of the fee system that would allow for 
increased revenue to be addressed. 
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 Implement a VMT fee collection and monitoring system that is easy to 
understand:  It is anticipated that with the equipment costs accounted for in this 
analysis (GPS for all vehicles currently on the roadway and VMT fee collection 
equipment at widespread service stations in Texas), motorists would not need to 
exert any additional effort in being charged a VMT fee in place of the state gas 
tax.  Motorists may be more likely to understand the VMT process if service 
station receipts were designed to report the total VMT fee amount charged to 
motorists, rather than merely including it in the total cost of gas as presently 
done. 
 Generate additional revenue to address mobility and infrastructure needs:  
Though likely not popular, this goal could be achieved under Scenarios 2-4.       
 Encourage the use of more fuel efficient vehicles:  This goal corresponds to the 
design of Scenario 3, in which fuel efficient vehicles are rewarded by being 
charged a lower per mile rate than vehicles with poor fuel efficiency. 
 More closely link travel to use of infrastructure:  While it is anticipated that 
this goal would be achieved under all of the proposed VMT fees, Scenario 4, in 
particular, links VMT fees to the type of roadway being traveled on, which in 
turn allows the VMT fee revenue to be used in addressing the mobility and 
infrastructure needs related to that roadway type.  
 Make the transition from the current state gas tax system to a VMT fee 
timely and affordable:  Installation of thin OBUs would be more affordable 
than installing thick OBUs in terms of the cost of the OBU unit.  In terms of the 
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transition to a VMT fee system, a widespread, upfront conversion to the VMT 
fee system, rather than a more gradual transition, was assumed in this analysis.  
Though costly, this fast conversion approach may make the transportation fee 
system less complicated in the long-run because all gasoline-run vehicles would 
be under the same system.  
 
RESEARCH LIMITATIONS SUMMARY 
 Several assumptions were made in performing this analysis.  First of all, only 
household gasoline-run vehicles were included in the analysis under the assumption that 
vehicles dependent on a different source of energy composed only a small percentage of 
all household vehicles.  Additionally, the breakdown of road-type travel by both urban 
households and rural households was based on an educated estimate.  Although an effort 
was made to obtain rough estimates of the actual disaggregation (by analysis performed 
by Mark Ojah), they are merely estimates based off of a small sample population.  Data 
obtained through the use of readings from more vehicles in more locations may help to 
eliminate uncertainty in these assumptions and may even eliminate the need to make any 
assumption at all through the use of accurate, up-to-date GPS readings.  It was also 
assumed that the filtered, weighted data used in this analysis were representative of the 
vehicle-owning population of Texas in the year 2008, although only select control totals 
were known concretely for the weighted totals of urban vehicle-owning households and 
rural vehicle-owning households.  In the future it may be possible to obtain more 
accurate estimates of the installation costs, operating costs, and leakage costs associated 
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with a VMT fee system.  It was assumed that the GPS and service station equipment 
installed up-front would span the whole 22 years ranging from 2009 to 2030, which 
encompass the analysis timeframe.            
 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The vehicle data available as part of the 2009 NHTS present an opportunity to 
further explore VMT fee scenarios in the future.  For example, because the cost of gas is 
provided for several of the NHTS vehicles, there is the potential to develop gas price 
elasticities that consider the effects of household demographic data ranging from 
household respondent race, to household life cycle, to household income level, to 
household geographic location.  Such an effort would likely be best served by using data 
from all states, rather than vehicles specific to Texas, given the broader range of gas 
prices listed across the nation than in Texas specifically.   
Future studies could also include diesel vehicles—and potentially even vehicles 
with other forms of energy such as electricity and natural gas.  However, such an 
analysis would only include vehicles running on sources of fuel other than gasoline if 
they were listed among a household‟s vehicles.  Thus, some commercial vehicles that are 
owned by the household may be included but most large diesel trucks would be excluded 
because they are generally not owned on the household level.  Additional research could 
investigate how travel by Texas households outside of the state of Texas should be 
addressed, as well as how non-Texas vehicles traveling on Texas roadways should be 
treated.   
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Another possible avenue of research could involve tweaking the set 4:3:2 ratios 
established in Scenario 3 in an attempt to analyze the equity impacts associated with 
different ratios based on vehicle fuel-economy.  In terms of Scenario 4, research could 
be done to better estimate or track the actual percentage of miles spent on urban 
roadways versus rural roadways by urban vehicle-owning households and rural vehicle-
owning households.  Alternatively, the VMT fee rate could be indexed based on 
household income level (similar to the U.S. income tax system) to reduce the regressive 
nature of a transportation fee system. 
As advances in technology continue to progress, it will become increasingly 
feasible and less costly to implement a VMT fee scenario in place of the current state gas 
tax, which could hold motorists more accountable for their use of the infrastructure.  
Research into VMT fees and their equity impacts are timely given their recent discussion 
on both state and federal levels.  The VMT fee scenarios analyzed as part of this research 
illustrate the varying equity impacts that can be achieved under different philosophies 
governing VMT fee design.  Pros and cons are associated with each of the scenarios 
included in this analysis.  The results of each scenario have been presented in the hope 
that they will be used as a tool by elected officials and policy-makers in evaluating the 
impact each scenario would have on their constituents as they work to achieve a bright 
future for the state of Texas.                 
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C3.  To help us understand the things that impact your travel choices, I have a few 
questions about your household.  Including yourself, how many people live in your 
household?  Please do not include anyone who usually lives somewhere else or is just 
vesting, such as a college student away at school.   
 
B1.  How many vehicles are owned, leased, or available for regular use by the people 
who currently live in your household?  Please be sure to include motorcycles, mopeds 
and RVs.  (HHNUMVEH) 
 
B2.  {I have a few questions about each of these vehicles.  Let‟s start with the newest 
vehicle.}  What is the make, model and year of this vehicle? 
 
C7.  I‟m going to read a list of races.  {In addition to being Hispanic, please/Please} tell 
me which best describes your race. 
 
Ca.  {Do you/Does FNAME/AGE/SEX} have a job? (WRKR) 
 
C22b.  Does the {VEHYEAR, MAKECODE, AND MODLCODE} have a commercial 
license plate?  (VEHCOMM) 
 
C22c.  Is it a hybrid or alternative fuel use vehicle?  (HYBRID) 
 
L7.  Please verify that you have a…{L_MAKE, L_MODEL, L_VYEAR} 
L9.  During the past 12 months, about how many miles was the {VEHYEAR, 
MAKECODE, MODLCODE} driven by all drivers?  (VEHMILES) 
 
L10.  About how many miles has this vehicle been driven since you‟ve had it?  
(ESTMILES) 
 
M13.  In surveys like these, households are sometimes grouped according to income.  
Please stop me when I get to the category that best describes your total household 
income, before taxes, in the past 12 months.  (HHFAMINC_C) 
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